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109/X/76-E THE  RAW  MATERIALS  DOSSIER 
Between  the wealthy countries of the earth and  the  poor  there is a 
permanent state of negotiation.  They  are  thrashing out  the methods  of balancint 
the world  economy  afresh~so that the Third World  countries can be  given a 
better deal.  The  negotiations  take  place in many  centres and  in many  forms  and 
they are subject  to many  turns  of fortune.  On  one  day it may  be  a  question  of 
seeking agreement  in redefining the monetary system of  the world;  and  the  FMI 
negotiations in Jamaica in January 1976  did  not  come  up  to all the expectations 
of the Third  World  countries.  On  another day there may  be  the simpler task of 
agreeing  to regulate  the world market  for a  single product,as was  done  in 1975 
for tin,for cocoa and  for coffee.  On  yet another day,discussion may  be  focussed 
on  solving the  food  problem,as  occurred in June  1975  when  the World  lt
100d  Council 
was  so  tumultuously brought  into being. 
This is  the"North-south dialogue",and all the  time  we  are  thinking·in 
terms  of  the northern and  the  southern parts of  the earth.  With  such a  multi-
tude  of approaches  to their problems,it might  be  feared  no  solution could be 
found  to redefine  the relations between  them.  This,however,  would  be  snapping 
ones  fingers at  the  three major  encounters already fixed between the developed 
and  the developing countries.  Two  of the negotiations,both of general scope, 
have already begun.  Jince February 1975  the  GATT  countries negotiating in 
Genev:a,have  entered  the active  phase  of  the "multilateral commercial neg-
otiations",known for short as  the  "Tokyo  Round".  1'he  object here,while  taking 
the special interests of  develop~rgcow1tries into account,is to  reduce or 
eliminate customs duties and  non-tariff barriers to  trade in agricultural 
p~oduce and  manufactured goods.  Secondly,  in December  1975,27 countries selected 
among  the most  representative western industrial countries and  Third world 
countries~opened the  "North-South dialogue" itself. Thirdly,we are  now  on  the 
eve  of an encounter of the very first importance.  In May  1976,the governments 
of 100 countries will be  sending ministers  to  Nairobi for the fourth United 
Nations eonference  on Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD).  No  setback in the Kenya 
talks can be  allowed  to happen,for it would  almost  inevitably engulf the  other 
ne£"otiations.  It is on  Nairobi  that all eyes are  turned. 
Oil and after 
It may  be  asked  why  the international community  has  chosen this moment 
for  clo~ely-reasoned discussions  on  a  problem which is far from being really 
new.  The  economic  development  of the Third  World  has  been  on  the agenda for a 
very long  time.  Everything in fact  began with the oil crisis. Those  peaceful 
carless Sundays  which  so  many  Europeans  enjoyed at the  end  of  1973,  were  the 
screen which hid  the forceful  entry onto  the international stai'e of the 
countries of  the Third World.  They  wanted  to  leap into the breach then and 
there,to take advantage  of the disarray of the West  following  the five-fold 
rise in oil prices.  To  them  the bold stroke of  the oil-exporting countries 
was  an example  to be  followed.  Within a  few  weeks  a  group of countries -- all 
of them  from  the Third World  -- had  successfully secured what  had  been beyond 
their reach in years  of  nego:~iation. Developing countries quickly recognised 
the  link between  oil,raw materials and  development.  They  knocked  louder than 
ever before  on  the  doors  of the  industrial countries of  the West,demanding 
explanations  and  setting in motion a  mighty drive for reform in the functionin£" 
of the  world  economy. -2-
The  first reaction among  the industrial countries was  to call a  halt. They 
then began organising their line of defence  on  the energy side,by forming  the 
International Energy Agency,the members  of which are almost all the  OECD 
countries,except France.  They  were assailed with demands  by  the countries of 
the Third World,sometimes in very lively terms;  but  they proceeded little by 
little to what  amounted  to a  searching of their conscience.  They  could not but 
recognise that their efforts at development  over the  past  two  decades  had not 
produced  the  expected results. This was  true enough;  for there are few  developing 
countries  today who  have  succeeded in getting their economic  plans really off the 
ground.  The  Third World  as a  whole  has  not  enough  industry and it now  has  too 
much  debt;  and it has not yet been able  to secure its defences  a~ainst famine. 
The  part it plays in world trade in manufactured  goods  is still extremely small. 
This searching of hearts,admittedly,  was  partly induced by fear;  for the  supply 
of raw  materials  to  the  western  econo~es was  under threat.  There  was  indeed 
no  group of raw  material producers in the Third World,which was  in a  position 
to repeat  the exploit of the oil producers.  The  world market for crude oil is 
not  comparable with any other.  Crude  oil stands out in importance as a  strategic 
raw  material;  exports come  predominantly from the Third World;  and there is no 
quick substitute.  Nevertheless  the industrial countries could not altogether 
escape "wildcat" action by Gther raw material  producers,who were  quick to exploit 
such strains as might appear in any of the markets.  In such cases  deliveries 
might be held up for a  time,or orders aight issue to  impose  big additions  to  the 
prices,as was  done,for example,  for Moroccan  phosphates.  The  supply of raw 
materials to industrial countries could not be  thrown altogether out of gear,but· 
there was  no  way  of excluding mishaps  on  the  road.  Added  to this,was  the boom  in 
raw  material prices in 1973-74 which  added  to  the fears  of the industrial world. 
From  loggerhead  to dialogue 
For some  months  the developing countries and  the industrial countries were 
engaged in discussions which  got  them  nowhere,and were  interspersed with threats 
and attacks,some of which were  quite direct.  ~he extraordinary meeting of  the 
United  ~ations Assembly  on  raw  materials and development,held in April 1974,  thus 
became  the scene  of open defiance and  the declaration about  the  "new  international 
economic  order" was  adopted against a  background of  ~tter confusion.  Quite a 
number  of industrial countries,including the United States,Germany and  Japan, 
cast their votes against a  text which is now  regarded as  the  economic  creed of 
developing countries. After all, it contained a  vigorous denunciation of the 
privileges enjoyed by industrial countriea,and the new  world economic  order is 
claimed by a  collection of countries believing themselves  to have  been abusively 
exploi~ed. It contains a  number  of claims likely to give rise to reservations 
among  the western countries.  They  include  the right  to nationalise and assert 
permanent  sovereignty over their natural resources;  there  should be an automatic 
link between the prices gf exports from  developing countries and  of  the goods 
they iaport;  there should be an association of raw  material producers;  the  chronic 
trade deficit of developing countries should disappear altogether;  limits should 
be  placed upon  the competition of synthetic articles with natural products;  low-
coat access should be  provided  to  the  technologies af  the West;  the activities 
of multinational corporations should be brought under control ••••• all this and 
a  great deal else. 
In april l974,therefore,  the relations between rich and  poor countries 
were  far from  being set fair.  Later there were  to  be  other misunderstandings and 
stormy passages.  They arose at Rome  in November  1974 at the w·orld  Food  Conference; -3-
again at Dakar in February 1975 at the  Conference  on  raw  materials of ministers 
from  the non-aligned countries;  at Lima  in the following March  at the  UNIDO 
Conference  on  the industrialisation of the Third World;  and yet again at Paris 
in April 1975,when  there was  a  check in the  progress of the  preparatory con- ~ 
ference for  the  "North-South dialogue".  Little by little the international 
community  was  edging up  a  blind alley.  And  yet,though the  seeds  of confrontation 
were  not wholly scattered,reason triumphed in the  end. 
The  turning point at Kansas 
The  v,oice  of reason came  in the first instance from  the EEC.  The  successful 
issue of negotiations between the  Nine  countries  of Europe and  the 46  countries 
of Africa,the Caribbean and  the Pacific  (some  of  them  among  the  poorest countries 
on earth)  was  hailed as a  success for the policy of development  cooperation,alike 
for Europe  and  for the Third World.  The  Lome  Convention,signed in February 1975,, 
marks  an important step forward  in the relations between North and South.  The 
regional solutions,which had  been negotiated and  not  imposedare matters  of 
universal value.  It is not  only a  matter of multilateralised financial aid,but 
also  such points as industrial cooperation,guaranteed markets for sugar producers, 
not  to  mention  the  quite original machinery,known as STABEX,for  stabilising 
export receipts.  Lome  by itself,however,  was  not  enough  to  thaw  out  the  relations 
between the industrial countries and  the  poor ones.  Much  depended  on  the attitude 
of the Americans,who  had till now  approached  the dialogue in a  not very talkative 
mood.  Eventually  vlashington diplomacy  took a  new  angle.  In the same  fortnight, 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made  two  key speeches -- on  May  13  in Kansas 
City and  on  ~~Y 28  to  the  OECD  Council in Paris. 
Mr.  Kissinger,to be  sure,  did not  make  any major express  concessions  to 
the ideas  of the Third World.  The  present  economic  system which has  brought  us 
to "record rates of growth"  should be  preserved,he believed.  :E'or  him,  the found-
ations of prosperity in industrial countries had  lain in freedom  of trade and 
of  capit~l and  technological transfer;  and  without  this  the  developing countries 
could not  hope  to  be  prosperous.  Nevertheless,  the  United States,without which 
"there is no  possibility of a  solution~' would  be  prepared  to  countenance various 
adjustments in this system for  the  sake  of facilitating the growth of Third World 
countries.  In yet another speech,made in September 1975 at the  UN  Extraordinary 
Session of the Assembly  on Development,  Mr.  Kissinger put his thoughts  into 
more  definite form.  The  adjustments  envisaged,he said,  should make  it possible 
to meet  the  three current  challenges  to  the world  economy  -- energy,raw materials 
and  food. 
The  Community  mediates 
The  change  in the American attitude fell short of the expectations  of 
Third World  countries,especially if these be  assessed  in the light of the  "new 
world  economic  order",but it went  far enough  for a  dialogue  to begin.  Since  the 
oil crisis the  economic  and financial  position of the Third World  countries had 
changed  considerably for  the worse.  These  countries had  been more  critically 
affected  than the industrial countries by  the rise in crude oil prices.  They 
had  passed  through a  food crisis. They  had  had  less benefit  than  the wealthier 
countries in the  raw  materials price boom  of  1973-74.  Whether  by necessity or 
by  reason,  it was  clear the  time  was  ripe for dialogue.  It v1as  this which was 
the  basis for  the  comparative  success  of  the  Extraordinary meeting of  the  UNO 
Assembly held in New  York,September 1  - 15  last.  ~dthout this success,none  of -4-
the  three major negotiations  mentioned above  would have  had  the least chance 
of success. 
The  compromise  resolution,adopted  ~t New  York,bears witness  to  the desire 
in both camps  to  find solutions which would  be  mutually acceptable.  The  EEC 
had  less  to  say in open session than had  the  United States;  but in the  lobbies 
it played a  decisive  part in developing  the compromise.  Before  the Assembly  met 
the Nine  had  coordinated their attitudes on  the basis of a  communication from 
the  European  Commission,and  they were  successful in maintaining their unity of 
approach throughout  the session.  Beheen the United States and  the  Third viorld, 
they played the part of conciliation and  mediation.  In the  coming  months 
Community  negotiators will doubtless  need  a  high degree  of skill to  keep  their 
function in the forefront  of discussion.  What  is needed  now  is to go  beyond  the 
assertion of high principles,such as  came  forward  in New  York,and  give  more 
definite replies to  the aspirations of  the Third World.  At  Paris and at Geneva 
the negotiations are already on  foot.  In both cases  the  reform of  the trade in 
raw  materials will have an important  place  in the discussions;  but  the  crucial 
test will be at Nairobi and,for  the developing countries,there is much  at stake. 
Raw  materials still provide  them with the bulk of their foreign currency earnings. 
Soon  they will be  having  to  serve as  a  basis for their industrialisation.  In 
advance of the Nairobi  talks,a raw  materials dossier is a  necessary document. 
It must  cover  : 
I.  Raw  materials and  development  containing the essential  dat~ needed for an 
understanding of  the  raw materials  problem. 
II. Stabilising the markets  or the  techniques devised or already in application 
to keep in order the world markets for raw  materials. 
III. 'lhe  major workings  of the  UNO  compromise  -- or the position of the chief 
protagonists  :  United States,  EEC  and  the Third World. 
IV.  Illustration or a  description of  some  of  the  markets  for  raw materials--
wheat,sugar,coffee,copper,textiles,rubber. -5-
Part  I  RAW  MATERIALS  AND  DEVELOPMENT 
1.  - The  world  trade in raw  materials 
2.  - Raw  material prices 
3.  - Cartel  risks 
4.  - Investment and  technology 
5.  - The  food  position in the Third \v'orld 
6.  - The  economic  and  monetary crisis. -6-
I. WORLD  TRADE  IN  RAW  MATERIALS  -- BASIC  INCOME  SOURCE  FOR  THIRD  WORLD  ------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------
Raw  materials  play  a~ very important  part in world  trade,accounting  (1973) 
for  25.6%  of total exports  from  industrial and developing countries combined. 
If fuel  (and  therefore oil)  be  included,  the  proportion is 36.7,%.  These,however, 
are global figures and  they cover a  number  of important disparities. 
- Exports  of  raw  materials are vital for  the developing countries,and even for 
industrial countries  taken together,they are not a  mere  supplement  to the 
export receipts.  Again using the 1973  figures,  exports  of  raw  materials and 
fuel -accounted  respectively for 42.3%  and  41.5%  of the total exports from 
developing countries,  a  total of 83.8.%.  For industrial countries,the share of 
raw materials in total exports was  21.5% and of fuel 3.6%,thus accounting alto-
gether for 25.1%.  It is easy to see  from  these figures why  it is the developing 
countries,who depend  so largely on selling their natural resources,who  are  the 
most insistent in claiming a  reform of world  trade  in raw  materials. 
- It is wrong  to  think of industrial countries as a  class,as being the  raw  material 
consumers.and the  developi~ countries as  bei~ the  producers. It is in fact 
the industrial countries who  account for the bulk of world  exports -- $  97  000 
million in 1973  out of a  world total of $151  700  million. 
By  way  of comparison exports  of  raw  materials from  developing countries were 
$40  000  million,and from  the eastern countries $14,200 million.  In other words, 
the industrial countries are far from  ranking principally as raw material 
importers,and  they are in fact  important  producers.  The  reverse is also true. 
Developing countries are  too  easily ranked as  raw  material producers and are in 
fact importers as well.  In 1973  they  imported nearly $10  000  million of food 
products  from  the industrial countries of the  West. 
- ~he flow  of exports from  the various groups  of countries are not  in any way 
comparable.  Bot~ the industrial countries of  the West  and  the  countries  of the 
East,do the  main  part of their export  trade with the countries in their own 
group.  The  developing countries,on the  other hand,  do  very little trade with 
one  another  (about $5  000  million in 1972)  and most  of their total exports 
($30,000 million)  ~o to the industrial countries of  the West  ($22  000  million). 
Classified by destination,  of the $97  000  million raw  material exports  from  the 
western industrial countries in 1973,  no Jess thanJ577  000  million went  to other 
countries in the  same  category,while  the sales to developing countries were 
$14  000  million and  to eastern countries $5  000 million.  In the same  way  the 
eastern countries  (1972)  exported a  total of  ~10 000 million of raw  materials, 
of which a  little more  than $5  000  million went  to  the western industrial 
countries and  scarcely $1  000  million to developing countries.  The  latter are 
the  only group basically dependent  on  the other two  groups,which are  themselves 
accustomed  to reserving their exports for those in the  same  group as themselves. 
The  developing countries have acquired the  image  of being  raw  material suppliers, 
not because they dominate  the world markets -- which is far from being the case--
but because they are  the  only group  predominantly supplying the other two  groups, 
especially the western industrial countries. -7-
- The  North-South trade flow amounts  to $45  000  million.  This figure  of 
$45  000  million is the focus  of  the discussions in hand  between  the rich and 
the  poor countries.  Its composition contains points of interest.  The  developi~ 
countries ·exported  tl973)  raw materials  to the industrial countries to a  value 
of $30  000  million. It is for this volume  of  trade that  the  rich countrie·s  · 
would  like to be given a  delivery euarantee;  but from  this we  must  not  jump 
to  the  conclusion that  the fiiUre is a  measure  of the western world  dependence 
on  the Third World.  The  industrial countries  themselves are big exporters  to 
the developing countries  t.o  a  value  (1973)  of nearly $15  000  million.  Food 
products  predominate,both in the exports  from  industrial countries  to devel-
oping countries  (over $10  000  million out  of a  total of $15  000  million)  and 
in the  other direction  ($16  000  million out  of $30  000  million). 
The  North dominates  the  markets 
The  above  general survey of the world  trade in raw  materials can be 
rounded  off with product data.  A statistical note was  compiled by  UNO  experts 
in preparation for the Extraordinary Assembly Session on  Raw  ~~terials,held 
in April 1974;  and calculations based  on  this give a  good  indication of  the_ 
hold each of the  three main  groups  of countries exercises upon  the different 
markets.  The  66  products listed by  UNO  can  thus be  put into three specific 
categories 
1)  .Markets  dominated  by developing countries  (18  products,of which developing 
countries-supply-over-65%-of-world-exports).  The  products are,erude oil, 
coffee,sugar,rubber,cocoa,tin,tea,bauxite,groundnuts,palm oil,copra oil, 
jute,groundnut oil,copra,sisal,tin-ore,palm kernel oil and  palm kernels. 
2)  Developing countries  cover an appreciable  part of  the market.  (10 articles, 
of-which-between-35~and-6Q%-of-world-exports-come-from-developing countries). 
These are,oil products,  copper,cotton,fruit,iron ore,timber,cattle-cake and 
oleaginous  flours,copper-ore,raw fertilizers,manganese ores. 
3)  rilarkets  dominated by western industrial countries. (37 articles,  of which 
. over-6~fo-of~-world-exports-come-from-western-industrial countries).  These 
are,  wheat,wood  pulp,grinding timber,aluminium,coal,maize,beef and  veal, 
wool,fish,soya,tobacco,nickel,rice,milk,leather,cheese,wine,butter,barley, 
pork,nickel ore,fur skins,animal oils and fats,lead,zinc,mutton and  lamb, 
bacon,soya oil,poultry,zinc ores,eggs,olive oil,lead ore,flax,linseed, 
cotton-seed oil,linseed oil. 
The  above  lists only 65  of  the  66  products.  The  rema~n~ng one  is chromium-
ore,which is dominated  by  the eastern countries with a  supply of 4o%  of all 
exports.  The  other products  of which  the eastern countries supply 15%  or  over~ 
of world  exports are coal,flax,timber and  grinding timber,raw fertilizers, 
cotton and  manganese  ore.  On  the  import side,  the articles most  in request. 
by  the  eastern countries are  palm kernels,linseed,cotton,sugar,barley,wheat, 
linseed-oil,wine,raw fertilizers,rubber and  poultry.  In general  the chief 
impression emerging from  the  table based  on  the  UNO  statistics is the  strong 
hold  of the western industrial countries on  the various world  markets. -8-
II.  RAW  MATERIAL  PRICES  :  CAUSES  OF  A FLARE-UP 
--••••••••••••a••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
The first question is whether the general movement  in raw  material Frices 
since the war  has  been to  the  detriment  of developing  countries which export 
them.  On  this question the experts are diYided.  A working party,including a 
number  of the most  eminent,  was  set up  by UNCTAD  and  was  not able in June  1975 
to  produce any definite reply.  The  controversy between the  experts is mainly 
concerned  on  the year of reference which should be  taken for measuring  changes 
in the purchasing power  of developing countries which export  raw  materials. 
A comparison based  on 1950 would  obviously be  to the  advantage of the  developing 
countries,because this year was  marked  by a  price boom  occasioned by the 
Korean war.  There are also a  number  of technical factors,for  the  price indices 
used for measuring  the general up-and-down movement  are not  in all cases 
regarded as satisfactory.  The  fact remains  that the  problem of  raw  material 
prices is a  fundamental issue.  It is the  background  to all the discussions 
between North and South.  Moreover,  if there is nowadays  a  great deal of talk 
about  raw  materials,the fact is due  to  the  price  problems.  More  precisely,  it 
is due to the price flare-up such as had  never been seen before,occurring in 
1973-74.  It very abruptly brought  to  light the  inadequacies  of the  international 
trade mechanism for raw  materials.  This makes  it important  that we  should 
examine  the  causes of the boom. 
Have  developing countries suffered a  long-term fall in their purchasing  power  ? 
For a  rough measure  of changes in the  2urchasing power  of developing 
countries since the war,  the essential information is what  specialists call 
the."terms of trade
11
•  This is the ratio calculated between the  prices of 
exports and  the  prices of imports.  For the  group  of countries with which we 
are here concerned,  the relevant ratio is between the  prices of the  raw  materials 
they habitually export and  the  prices of the  manufactured  good~. they import. 
The  calculation is naturally full of approximations.  It may  be  ~due simplif-
ication to assume  the developing countries import nothing but  ~nufactured 
goods and that these were  produced nowhere  but in the western industrial 
countries.  ~hey may  be,and in fact  they are,  importers  of other raw  materials, 
such as wheat  and oil. 'J:he  most  we  can say is,  that manufactured goods are  the 
principal class of item in the  imports  of developing countries. 
The  UNCTAD  secretariat has  made  a  calculation relating to  28 articles 
with which developing countries are concerned and  the  changes  in the  purchasing 
power  of these countries over the  period 1952-73.  Over  this period it compares 
the  price  curve  for the  28  products and  for manufactured  goods.  Its conclusion 
is,that for all the  products  taken together the annual  loss of  purchasing  power 
was  2.2,%.  Practically all the individual products were  affected by  the fall. It 
was  at its worst  (over  3%  p.a.) for cocoa,manganese  ore,bananas,cocoa,coffee, 
wool  and  cotton.  It was  medium  (between  1%  and  2% p.a.) for tea,tobacco, 
aluminium,alumina,iDon ore,lead and  phosphates.  It was  classed as moderate 
(between 0  and  1%)  for jute and  oranges.  Only  the  developing countries which 
produce sugar,bauxite,copper,tin and  zinc  enjoyed a  rise in the prices of  the 
raw  materials  they produce,sufficient to offset the increased cost of manu-
factured goods. -9-
According  to the UNCTAD  secretariat,therefore,  the deterioration of the 
purchasing power  of developing countries since the war,does  not admit  of any 
doubt.  This  express conclusion of course is open  to criticism on  the  grounds 
mentioned above.  The  period covered  by  the  UNCTAD  calculations does  not  include 
the 1973-74 boom.  The  lack is made  good  in another study carried out  by the 
World  Bank.  The  terms  of  trade are analysed in relation to  34  articles exported 
by developing  countries  over the  period 1950-74.  The  index,based  on  1973 = 100, 
rose in 1974  to  116;  but this compares  with 125  in 1950 and  127  in 1954.  In 
other words,  the  "real" prices of  the  34  raw  materials  covered  by  the cal-
culations never  recovered  their prices of the early fifties,even in the  1974 
boom.  This again supports  the  contention that developing countries  have  suffered 
a  deterioration in their purchasing power. 
'l'he  1973-74  boom 
Quite  suddenly the machine  wen~ out  of gear.  Prices for raw  materials 
which  had  been  comparatively steady  through the sixties and  had  indeed had 
a  slight  tendency  to  ease,  abruptly turned upwards  in 1972,took wing and 
zoomed  to a  peak in the  second  quarter of 1974.  There were a  few  exceptions 
tea,bananas,jute,hides and  leather -- but apart from  these  no  product escaped 
the rise which  was  quite unprecedented. 
Between  1972  and  1974  the  prices of cocoa,sisal and  zinc  rose  to practically 
three times  their price at the outset.  The  prices of wheat,rice,timber,copper 
and  tin advanced  to  twice  the  former level and  the  price of sugar was  multi-
plied by almost  four.  The  advancing tide carried everything with it. 
In the  third quarter of  1974  the wave  toppled over and  broke,and almost 
every one  of the  products  was  involved.  The  prices went  on  tumbling well  into 
1975,but  by  the end  of that year some  signs of recovery were  beginning to 
appear.  We  may  ask who  it was  who  got  the benefit of the 1973-74  boom  ?  It 
would  be absolutely-wrong to believe that developing countries as  a  whole  were 
the main beneficiaries.  No  emphasis  could  be  too  much  in insisting that  these 
countries are very far from  having an export monopoly  in raw  materials.  Most 
of  them  have  to buy  their cereals from  industrial countries  (especially USA). 
Horeover  there  can be  no  denying  the fact  that  the rise in oil prices,though 
it affected many  industrial countries,  was  also a  heavy burden on  the  trade 
balances of many-a  developing country. 
The  prices of manufactured goods  which  the Third World  imports  were  a 
long way  from  remaining steady during the  raw  material  boom.  For the most  part 
whatever gain the developing  countries were  able to make  by  putting up  the 
prices of  the  raw  materials  they sold was  very quickly swallowed  up  by  the 
higher prices for the goods  they imported.  The  secretariat of  GATT  circulated 
an extremely informative note in I~y 1975.  It worked  out  a  relationship 
between the prices of imports  of three main  categories of goods -- manufactures, 
fuel and  cereals.  The  results need  no  commentary.  'lhere was  a  net  loss for 
Third lrlorld  countries  producing copper,bananas,rubber,coffee,tea,tobacco, 
hides and  leather,jute and  iron ore.  In other words,  the rise in the prices 
they charged for what  they sold  were  less  than  those  they had  to pay for 
the manufactures,the fuel and  the cereals  they bought.  On  the other side of - 10-
the picture the  countries  which were  able  to offset the  higher prices of 
manufactures  by  the  rise in those  of their exports were  the  producers  of 
cotton,tin,coconut oil,groundnut oil,palm oil,cocoa and  copra. 
Even  in these cases,however,  the rise  (again in the  period 1969-71-74) 
were  less than enough  to offset the rise in prices for fuel and  cereals.  In 
fact  the producers  of sugar were  the  only ones  in the,  Third World  whose  price-
rises were  enough to leave them  a  surplus after covering the higher prices 
under the  three main  import headings.  The  GATT  analysis helps get rid of  some 
of the nonsense.  Conclusively ·a,  rise in raw  material  prices is not  necessar~.Ly 
a  benefit to  the  countries of  the Third Vlorld.  \~orld trade  has  to be  looked 
as a  whole. 
An  unfortunate set of circumstances 
What  then were  the  real origins of the 1972-74 boom  ? 
lvlany  explanations have  been put forward,alike  from  Brussels  lEuropean 
Commission)  from  Geneva  \UNCTAD,GATT)  and  from  New  York  (UNO).  In an attempt 
to identify the essential points,  a  distinction has  to be  drawn between  raw 
foodstuffs  and  industrial raw  materials.  For the former  the flare-up in prices 
came  from  inadequacies ,of supply,in the latter from  a  runaway  demand.  The  fall 
in 1972  crops,though it was  not  on  a  big scale,  was  enough  to bring  exa~gerated 
rises in prices.  The  inadequacy of supply was  the result of an unusual  combin-
ation of adverse factors -- bad  crops in the  USSR,  reduced  crop area in the 
United States,  widespread  shortage  of rainfall and catastrophic drought in 
Africa and Asia;  fall in the world  catch of fish;  frosts in Brazil  destroyin~ 
a  large part of the coffee  crop.  ;J.'here  were  some  products, such as  sugar,  for 
which the bad weather conditions accentuated an imbalance which was  already 
structural.  In other cases,  especially some  of the vegetable oils,the growth 
in production was  maintained,but prices were  carried away  in a  general upward 
movement,because of the  interconnexions  between the different food  and  fodder 
markets. 
The  runaway  prices for industrial raw materials,on the  other hand,  were 
due  to  the unprecedented  jump  in demand  from industrial countries where 
expansion was  running at full tilt. To  meet  this fantastic  demand  the counter-
part supplies were  lacking.  This was  largely due  to comparative under-investment 
in the years  immediately before the boom.  This  in its turn can be  traced  to 
the fact  that during the sixties raw  material prices were  ~ot sufficiently 
remunerative.  There are various  other factors  which help  to  explain the  price 
boom.  ~nti-pollution measures  had  put  new  cost burdens  on mining  companies; 
the higher oil prices had made  mineral  ores more  expensive  to extract and 
process;  there were  crises of a  political character,nationalisations,strikes 
and  similar disturbances;  and the level of  stocks was  abnormally low. 
Moreover,  there was  one  factor conditioning the boom,both for food  products 
and for industrial materials. This was  speculation.  ~here can be  no  doubt about 
the fact that in recent years the markets for basic products have attracted 
a  flow  of capital greatly swollen by the quest for an anti-inflation hedge, 
and for insurance against currency fluctuations. !he' volume  of business  trans-
acted in raw  material markets  was  swollen quite out  of proportion to  the 
increase in world  imports.  Most  popular among  the speculators of the world 
were  the markets for  su~~r and  for non-ferrous metals. -II-
III. CARTELS  S~~LL RISKS  BUT  ••••• 
For the developing countries,the example  of the  oil producers might  well 
be  tempting.  How  indeed could  they fail to  be  thrilled when  the  OPEC  countries 
suddenly  jumped  the  price of oil and  obtained in three months  what  years  of 
discussion and  tergiversation had  not  brought  to hand  ?  Three  years  earlie~ 
it would  have  been beyond  the  bounds  of imagination that Iran should  be  taking 
up a  major shareholding in Krupps,and  ordering nuclear  power  stations. Whenever 
opportunity offers,  the developing countries always  maintain  that groups  of 
producers are legitimate.  ~·or them  this ranks as  one  of the  more  important 
of their claims,and  the  developed countries do  their best ta play it down. 
Are  there really big risks in the cartelisation of markets  by developing 
countries which  produce  raw  materials  ?  Surely not.  Oil is not a  raw material 
of the  same  kind as most  of the  others. 
The  OPEC  stranglehold 
Events  can always  be understood  +.he  better after they have  happened.  Looking 
back it is easy to see  the factors which foreshadowed  concerted action by  the 
oil exporters.  The  OPEC  had been formed  in 1964;  and its members  were  certainly 
very dissimilar in their economic,social and  political systems.  All  of  them, 
however,  were  develeping countries;  and  no  developed  country could  possibly 
deny  the stranglehold they  possess  over the  market for crude oil. It grew 
stronger as  the years went  by,and  reached  the  point of controlling  8~o of the 
world's exports.  Little by little,too,  the  OPEC  countries  took possession of 
the oil operating companies;  and  this enabled  them  to  choose  their own  moment 
for bringing the  output  rate under control. This was  a  field in which  Libya 
was  the first to act.  On  a  general assessment  of  the  position,the oil exporting 
countries had  three advantages,without which any cartel action is in practice 
impossible.  '.l.'he  advantages  were  : 
- big reserves of foreign exchange.  This applied to several  OPEC  members,such 
as-saudi-Xrabia;Kuwait-and-Libya.  they thus  had  funds  in hand  to carry the 
short-term cost of reducing their deliveries,if it.should be  decided  to do 
so,for the  purpose  of bringing the market  into line with the  interests of 
the cartel. 
lack of  quiek~available substitutes.  In most  consuming  countries  imported 
oii-covers-abuut-5~fo-of-the-energy-used,so that the  rate of dependence is 
enormous.  Other sources  of  primary energy  cannot be brought at all easily 
into play as substitutes for oil. 
small stocks in consuming  countries.'.l.'he  stocks in consuming  coun~ries rep-
resented-average-consumption-for-three months.  This is too little for an 
article so vlidely used  and  of  such strategic importance. 
The  oil-producing countries  were alert in spotting a  favourable  state of 
the market and adroit in the  use  they made  of it; but their difficulties began 
when  it came  to making  sure  of  the  continuity of their cartel.  In this 
connexion the  Council for  International  ~conomic folicy,an American official 
body,  issued a  report  (December  1974)  in which  it cominents  :  "Cartelsusually 
break up  because  of a  deterioration in their monopolistic  position,insofar 
as substitute products  and  additional suppliers  make  their appearance  in the 
market.  Other factors  which have  to be  taken into consideration are differences 
between  the  members  about  prices wnich  are  to be  defended  on  a  falling demand, - 12-
and of course,rivalries between the members  themselves."  The  survival  of~ 
cartel is a  matter of  continuous concern.  In all circumstances it presupposes 
from  the outset a  considerable  hold  over the market,and this has  to be  main-
tained by conciliation between members  and  facing the  reactions of consuming 
countries.  In the  case of oil the reaction in question was  quite clear.  The 
formation of an International  ~nergy Agency  was  one  step calculated to 
enfeeble the  position of the  exporters.  Others were  the campaigns against 
energy wastes and  the review  of energy  policies.  The  life of a  cartel seems 
to beforcibly transient. For oil there is the  danger  that  the  transitional 
period may  last longer than anything which might  be  possible for any other 
raw  material.  In this sense,too,oil is not  a  raw  material like the others. 
But  does  this mean  there is no  risk of cartelisation of markets by developing 
countries ?  It is indeed difficult to suppose  that these countries could really 
set up cartels which would  endure.  We  can see  examples  in products  over which 
they have  a  certain market ascendancy through  the large  proportion of world 
exports they supply which is,of course,  an absolute condition for setting up 
a  cartel. Such an organisation,for example,  to cover cocoa or coffee or tea, 
might  very well run against the interests of the exporters themselves,because 
it would  discourage consumption in developed countries.  For vegetable oil (e.g. 
groundnut oil,copra oil or palm kernel oil)  there are unduly abundant  poss-
ibilities of substitution. Rubber,jute or sisal can be  quickly replaced by 
synthetic  products.  In sugar the developed countries -- and  the  EEC  most  of 
all -- are in a  position to  boost their own  production considerably.  For timber 
(e.g.  sawn  timber and  plywood)  the  product types are too diverse for cartels 
to be really effective.  In fact  the list of products for which cartel action 
by developing countries would  be  possible,scarcely extends  beyond  such products 
as bauxite,tin,perhaps copper and manganese.  Even  in these cases the action 
taken could not have  such wide  scope as  that taken by  the oil producers.  In 
the  case of bauxite,an international association has been formed  on  the init-
iative of Jamaica;  and Australia as  the world's biggest  producer,though a 
developed country,has become  a  member  of it. For tin there has  been an inter-
national agreement since  l956,and the machinery set up is calculated to defend 
the  purchasing power  of  producers  who  cannot  contemplate  going any further.  In 
copper the four chief producers in the Third World  (Peru,Chile,Zambia and 
Zaire  )  have set up an association,but it has  not  succeeded in dictating prices, 
because it has  not sufficient hold  over the market.  In manganese,about a  third 
of total world  exports  come  from developed countries,and this  provides  them 
with a  guarantee against the risk of cartelisation by developing countries. 
Remembering  also that most  of  the  producing countries do  not  command  adequate 
financial  resources, it is easy to see  that lasting cartel action is difficult 
to envisage. 
How  then can we  explain the  reluctance  of the developed countries about 
the formation of  producers'  associations,on which the countries of the Third 
World  are  so keen ?  'l'here is in fact  one  main  reason -- the fear  th11,t  when 
there are strains in the market,such associations may  be  able to turn them 
quickly  to their own  profit.  If,for example,a strike in developed  countries 
should force  up  the world market  price of copper as a  result of short-term 
insufficiency of supply,the CIPEC  countries -- which already have  a  long 
experience in cooperation -- could easily come  to a  decision among  themselves 
as  to how  best to take advantage  of  the state of the market.  They  will already - 13-
have  gained command  of various formulae  which will save a  lot of pointiess 
discussion.  The  example  makes  it clear enough  that  the developed countries 
can indeed fear  "wildcat" action by.  developing countries,though it will be 
for the latter to find their way  back into the  ranks  once  the tension has 
disappeared.  One  country,incidentally,  was  able  to act on  these lines.  This 
was  Morocco,which  took full advantage  of the strains in the market  to order 
a  four-fold  increase in the price of phosphate,but had  unwillingly to accept 
a  continuing diminution because of the competition of American  producers. 
Jamaica,too,  was  able  to secure a  doubling of  the  price of bauxite.  One~~ 
cooperation has  become  a  habit,why should not several countries combine  to 
obtain advantages  such as individual countries in a  comparatively strong 
commercial  position have  been able  to secure for  themselves.  Already there 
have  come  into existence a  number  of associations consisting solely of dev-
eloping countries -- "caf~ mondial",the association of countries producing 
natural rubber,the union of banana exporting countries and  others.  The  most 
powerful  of these,and the  one  which holds  out  the most  evident threat to 
developed  countries,  is the  CIPEC. 
The  copper market,in terms  of the value traded,is one  of the biggest 
raw  material markets,ranking with coffee,sugar and  wheat,and added  to which 
is its strategic importance.  In order to make  up for their comparatively weak 
position in many  world markets,  developing countries can have  recourse  to 
another weapon,  a  sort of  "pool"  of producers'  associations.  'rhis idea was 
put forward  in February 1975  at the Conference at Dakar  of ministers from  non-
~ligned countries.  The  following August,.the .Lima  Conference  earmarked  $3  000 
million for a  fund  to support  the  prices of raw  materials exported from 
developing countries;  but up  to  now  this fund  has  not yet seen the light. 
Perhaps  this is just as well,if there is to  be  a  real dialogue  between  the 
rich countries and  the  poor.  The  former miiht easily regard  the setting up of 
such a  fund as a  hostile act,and  tha current talks in Paris -- or even 
UNCTAD  IV  in Nairobi -- might  be  envenomed.  In actual fact it should not  be 
forgotten  that the developed  countries,too,  have  their own  ways  of controlling 
markets.  What,for example,would be  the  reaction of  the Third World. if there 
should be  "reprisals" by  the United States and  Canada  which,according to  the 
American  expert,  Mr.  Lester Brown  "today control by  themselves a  bigger 
proportion of world grain exports than do  the  countries of  the Middle East 
of oil exports"? 
It is indeed true,that in 1966-70  the United States supplied no  less 
than half the world  exports  of cereals.  We  have already noted  (page 7  above) 
that a  great many  markets are controlled by  the developed countries.  In a 
number  of cases,too,  they have  set up  producers'  associations with the dev-
eloping countries.  This is the  case with bauxite,mercury,iron and various 
others. - 14-
IV.  INVESTMENT  AND  TECHNOLOGY  :  THE  DISPUTED  POviER  OF  THE  l\'iULTINATIONALS 
Financing  the production of  raw  materials calls for a  great deal of 
capital,and  technologies which are increasingly sophisticated.  From  this 
standpoint -- and  there is no  object in refusing to admit it -- the dev-
eloping countries are considerably in arrear.  The  "nouveaux  riches" of the 
oil world can of  course  stand in for the industrial countries of the West 
in matters  of project finance;  but they cannot  (yet)  supply the  technology. 
This is still the  perquisite of  the western countries which,incidentally, 
are not  particularly keen about  passing  on  their knowhow  to developing 
countries.  Some  of the firms  in the West  have  important cooperation agreements 
with eastern countries. 
The  degree  to which  the  developing countries are  dependent varies from 
sector to sector and from  product to product.  Producing wheat  certainly calls 
for capital,but the first thing for countries which are  predominantly rural, 
is the  problem of getting production organised.  On  the  other hand  a  great deal 
of technological  knowledge  is needed  to  produce  copper or  ni~el and  the 
technologies become  more.  and more  advanced as  the mines  are  progressively 
worked  out and become  more  difficult to  operate.  Mining is an expensive  passtime. 
For example,the big copper mine at Bougainville  (Papua-New  Guinea), before it 
could be  made  operational,took over eight years of  surveys and works  at a  total 
cost ,estimated at $400 million.  ·.l'he  problems  of  investment and  technology are 
at their most acute in industries of high capital intensity,such as mines, 
forestry and  wood  pulp and also in industries where  there is strong  competitio~ 
between natural and  synthetic products,such as  textiles,leather and  rubber. 
Natural versus  synthetic 
It may  be noted in parenthesis,that synthetic  products are among  the 
difficulties with which developing countries have  been confronted.  Firms  in 
western  ~ountries have  made  big investments in making substitutes;  and since 
the beginning of the sixties this has  had its natural effect in the very small 
growth in the exports of the natural product  from Third World  countriss. 
Massive  R & D expenditure -- around $2  000 million annually --by the  big 
western chemical  companies  has greatly reduced  the Share  of  the market  covered 
by natural  products which  come  principally from  the  poorer countries.  These 
companies  have  huge financial and technical resources,often exceeding the 
whole  of  the  resources available for investment in any  of the  countries 
producing  the natural products. 
The  power  of the multinationals 
The  manifest superiority of  the Vlest  in matters of  technology and invest-
ment  brings us  inevitably to consider the  problem of the multinational corp-
orations.  For many  years  they have  reigned unchallenged in the developing 
countries,but in the last few  years things have  changed.  In many  of  the dev-
eloping countries there has  been keen criticism of  the way  these corporations 
set about  the exploitation of  raw  materials,  especially minerals.  Many  auth-
orities have  been doing their utmost  to  show  that  the activities of  the multi-
nationals were  not always  compatible with the  development  strategy of Third 
World  countries.  The  criticism refers to  the  three  major capacities associated 
with the multinationals in regard to  raw  materials.  These  are  : - 15-
- technological capacity  :  The  countries of  the Third  ~orld,led by  Algeria, 
coiii.piain-that-the-western world -- and  more  especially the multinationals 
deny  them  a  fair share of  technological knowledge.  Rights  to  patents  taken 
out in the western countries are  only sparingly made  available;  and  even when 
they are,the costs are so high and  the  patent itself is designedly so  obscure 
that  the  developing  countr~es--subject once  more  to their having  to find  the 
finance -- are  forced  to  seek out western experts who  alone  can  "decode"  the 
patent.  Moreover,  the  technology  is often designed for developed  countries and 
does  not  come  close enough  to  meeting the  needs  of countries where  conditions 
of climate,geography and  topography and  economic  circumstances are quite 
_different.  Noreover,  when  these western firms  are  commissioned  to  put  up an 
operating unit in a  developing country,they make  abusive  use  of their "tech-
nological  power  "  by making  false  technical excuses as  pretext for buying 
material from  the developed  countries,when corresponding local products would 
have  done  just as well. 
- capacity to invest  :  the multinational corporations  have  a  financial standing 
such-as-few-developing States could boast.  It is comparatively easy for  them 
to raise money  in the  western capital markets,national or international.  Often, 
too,  they are able  to finance  investments from  their own  resources.  It is true, 
too,that  they usually like  to have  "several  eggs  in the  same  basket"  in the 
hope  of  lessening the financial  risk.  1'or example,mining  companies  often work 
several  types  of ore in the  hope  that profits on  one  will offset  the  losses on 
another.  Developing countries,on the  other hand,  often depend  on  what  they can 
earn from  a  single product,or at best, .a- limited number.  Price fluctuations 
make  it extremely difficult for them  to  frame  and  carry out  a  long-term 
investment  programme.  In many  cases national savings are insufficient and  the 
countries  themselves  do  not  qualify for access to the great capital markets 
of  the world,  so that  the  only finance  they can get is from  the big multi-
national  companies,even for  production units of their own  if they have  any. 
At  the  UNIDO  Conference  on industrialisation,held at Lima  in :fiiarch  1975,  the 
CIPEC  countries  (Chile,Zaire,Zambia and  Peru)  gave  illustrations of the  incon-
veniences  which may  arise from  this state of financial  dependence.  A point 
they made  was,that the  international financing of projects is usually subject 
to an obligation regarding the  technology to be used. Those  who  supply the 
capital ask.:.·  ..  for a  rate of  profit which  only certain specific  technologies 
can achieve.  In other words,the  technological level required is such that  only 
western firms are in a  position to supply the tools,apparatus and  material 
needed for its application.  This is so  much  the worse  for  the  industrialisation 
of the  country in question;  and,if special care is not  taken, delays are liable 
to pile one  upon another.  As  things  stand  today,  the  countries of the Third 
World  make  only a  ridiculously small contribution of 7%  to the world's  indus-
trial activity.  In the  Lima  declaration it is proposed,that  this  should be 
raised  to  25%  by  the year 2000.  The  local processing and  making-up of  raw 
materials  should play a  very important  part in this decisive strategy for 
the  economic  future  of  the  Third  ~orld. 
There  is more  to it than this. The  provider of  the finance  usually has  pro-
cessing units of his own  in some  distant country to handle  the raw  and  semi-
processed materials.  He  accordingly refuses  to cooperate in projects  put 
forward  by a  developing country for the  specific  purpose  of raising the  added 
value.  To  put it baldly, the  11 plans"  of  :the  multinational  corpo~a.tions- are-not 
often compatible with  the  development  planning of the  poorer countries. - 16-
- marketing circuits. The  marketing divisions of the multinationals are usually 
vecy-much-on-the-ball.  1'he  nickel ores  of New  Caledonia,for example,  will 
already have  found a  buyer in a  developed  country before  they are even taken 
out of the ground.  Multinational companies  have  very highly developed marketing 
circuits,and they alone hold the keys.  Often,too,  they have gentlemen's 
agreements among  themselves  to avoid  over-competitive selling. An  example  of 
this was  seen in the  intervention of  the  EEC  Commission in l975,under the 
anti~trust provisions  of  the Treaty of Rome,seeking to set aside an agreement 
between Europe's leading aluminium  producers  (Pechiney Ugine  Kuhlmann, 
Alusuisse,  Vereinigte Aluminium Werke  and  others)  fixing the  prices to be 
charged and discounts  to be allowed  to European customers.  These  marketing 
circuits were  built up  by patient action by  the multinationals  over very 
long periods.  It gives  them  some  sort of monopoly  status which they are  in 
a  position to abuse  without any regard  to the interests of the countries 
from which  they get  their raw  materials.  Thus  they can adjust their production 
rate to suit the needs  of their western customers without  paying any heed  to 
the  local outlets.  They  stand  on  very firm ground  in their relations with 
the authorities in developing countries;  but it would  be all wrong  to over-
estimate their power.  For some  years  they have  been  running into  improvised 
and  often incoherent  opposition from  Third  iiorld  countries anxious  to re-
constitute their "permanent  sovereignty"  over their natural resources. 
During the sixties a  host of nationalisation schemes  came  close  on  one 
anothers heels;  but if they had not been carefully thought  out beforehand, 
the country responsible for  them  quite often found itself in serious  economic 
difficulties. It is hard to cut oneself off over-night  from finance,technoloey 
and  marketing  connexions,even if they have not in the  past  been used consist-
ently for the benefit of the developing country itself. Governments  often had 
no  alternative to quick and  ruthless action,because attempted discussion 
between companies and  the  local authorities so often ended  in a  storm. 
Ending  the uncertainty 
This gradual recovery by  developing countries of control over their 
natural resources,  linked as it is with the  express political desire of the 
Third World  to  have  the  process  speeded up,has given rise to a  serious mis-
understanding.  Multinational companies  are increasingly doubtful about  in-
vesting in '.l:hird  11orld  countries, preferring others which are politically 
more  "reliable
11
•  They  take unkindly to  the  new  economic  conditions  \e.g. 
fiscality and  dividend remittances)  or the  legal ones  te.g.  property owner-
ship)  to which  they are made  subject.  Nost  of all they fear that when  they 
have  carried out  an investment  they may  lose it by  confiscation.  One  must, 
nevertheless,  accept  the evidence,as was  done  in a  report by  the  International 
Labour  Office  ("recent events and  progress in mines  other than coal" June  1975 ): 
"In the  mining  industr~es there are  only a  few  companies  which  possess both 
the practical knowledge  of technique and  mana~ement which is necessary for 
the successful  conduct  of  large-scale modern  mining  operations,  and also 
access  to  the  sources of finance  required,.  If the misunderstanding between 
multinational  companies  and  the Third World  countries  were  to continue  on 
its present basis,the international community  would  be  exposing itself to 
a  big risk -- the risk of under-investment  which  could not fail to set up 
increasingly serious disturbances in the world markets  for  raw  materials. - 17-
The  elimination of such risks should be  the  target in any  ne~otiation between 
the North and  the South.  This  presupposes  that the western countries are 
willing to recognise  the desire of the Third World  countries to  promote  their 
own  industrialisation,and to exercise their own  national sovereignty over 
their own  natural resources. 
In seeking a  compromise,the western and  the developing countries might 
usefully adopt  a  legal expedient which has  been gaining acceptance  on  the 
international  scene for  some  years  past.  This  is the formation of "joint 
companies",in which  the  host  country holds  51%  of the capital,while  the 
rest is in the  hands  of foreign-owned  private companies. 
V.  FOOD  FOR  THE  THIRD  WORLD  :  CEREALS  DEFICIT  RAISES  ANXIETIES  =========================================================== 
There are 400 million human  beings suffering from  under-nourishment. 
This  simple  dramatic fact is proof  enough  that the world  trade in foodstuffs 
is badly out  of balance.  The  fate of great numbers  of human  beings depends 
in fact  an markets  governed by the  iron law  of demand  and  supply;  and  for 
the countries of  the Third World  the results have  been utterly disastrous. 
Cereals are  the basic foodstuff for a  large part of humanity;  ~nd in these 
the developed  countries -- most  conspicuously the United States -- wield 
complet~ control.  The  food  problem is still the  basic weakness  of the Third 
World.  The  crisis which  developed after the  poor crops  of 1972  has still not 
been fuily absorbed.  Though it did much  to make  governments alive to the 
problem there is one  essential fact it should not be  allowed to obscure.  This 
is,that the  food  position of the Third World  has already been growing worse 
for a  number  of years.  During  the sixties food  production grew at much  the 
same  rate in developed and  developing countries,but in the latter,  the  increase 
in production per head  of population was  very much  the  lower.  "In 1961-63", 
say the FAO  experts,  "food  production per head in the developed countries 
was  three  times greater than in the developing countries;  and in 1971-73 it 
was  three-and-a-half times as  great."  These  ratios were  reached despite 
the restriction policies of many  developed countries.  The  growth in the  food 
production in developing countries was  much  smaller than  the growth in pop-
ulation. 
Discouraging outlook 
All this made  the 1972  cr1s1s  the  more  serious.  It brought  to every-
body's attention "the serious unpreparedness  of  the entire world  for  the 
vagaries  of  the weather".  The  world  production of wheat fell 2%,rice  5%.This 
led to  prices rocketing and  world  stocks disappearing.  In 1973  things  got 
a  little better;  but in 1974  there was  to  be  another fall in the world  output 
of wheat  and  secondary cereals  to a  total of 1,010 million tonnes against 
the  1973  figure  of  1,052 million tonnes. 
In 1975,though production was  again better,  world  stocks  were  still 
at a  critical level of only 10  or 12  ~ of total cereal consumption compared 
with an estimated security level of 17  or la%.  For Third  world  countries which 
have  to  import,the cost of supplies was  materially higher.  The  cereals deficit 
had  been estimated in 1972 at $2  500  million;  and  in 1974 it reached $10  000 
million.  Cereals are,in fact,the principal item in the  food  imports into 
developing countries.  The  imports  of meat,sugar and fish are comparatively - 18-
small,and the question arises whether this increase in the  cost of cereals 
cannot be  remedied.  According  to  the  :F'AO  ("the world food and agriculture 
situation",July 1975)  remedies  seem unlikely.  In 1985,developing countries 
with a  market  economy  will have  to face  a  net cereals deficit of nearly 85 
million tonnes,against an average  of  only 16 million tonnes  in 1969-7l,prior 
to which these countries were  net exporters.  In 1974 dollars,the shortfall in 
1985 will be  $18 000 million.  ~oreover, the  total deficit applies to all 
market  economy  developing countries;  and if we  were  to exclude  the countries 
such as Argentina and  Thailand,which are  themselves cereal exporters,  the 
deficit might well be  over  100 million tonnes  per annum,or  three  times  the 
amount  of the  average  imports in 1969-71.  All this is based  on  the  assumption 
that production rates will be  normal.  In a  good year  the deficit might  be 
smaller;  but in a  year of bad  crops it might  be  120 million tonnes  or over by 
the mid-eighties.  This is an enormous  figure,if we  think back to the  cereals 
deficit of the Third 'world  countries of around  52  million tonnes  in 1973-74. 
The  developed  countries could cover the deficit by  increasing their production. 
If wheat,like oil,  were  to become  a  negotiating weapon  between North and South, 
it is to be noteu that it looks  like becoming a  stronger weapon  during the next 
few  years.  Did  not Mr.  Kissinger,the American Secretary of State,  ask the 
developed  countries of  the world  to raise their wheat  production when  he  spoke 
at the World  Food  Conference  in Rome  (November  5-16  1974). 
Nowadays  it is fashionable  to be  pessimistic about  the food  situation 
in the Third \'iorld, but this has  not always  been the case.  In the  .l-ate  sixti.Jes_: 
the  "green revolution"  was  in full force,and  everything was  for  the best in 
the best of all possible worlds.  Tho~gh the countries of  the Third World  are 
not yet able  to feed  their  own  populations,the growth in their total food 
production was  fully as  good  as  that of  the developed  countries.  Undoubtedly 
the  "green revolution"  helped diminish the  food deficit in developing countries; 
but nowadays  its has  its critics nevertheless.  Underemployment  in agriculture 
was  made  worse  by mechanisation;  and in the  poorer countries work  and  bread 
are often thought  of as  practically the  same  thing.  The  new  land brought  into 
cultivation was  not always  adequately irrigated,and in too  many  cases  the 
methods  of irrigation were  bad.  The  substitution of high-yielding varieties 
of cereals for  those traditionally grown,did not  go  ahead fast  enough.  The 
only  thing which went  according to  plan was  the growth in the  consumption of 
fertilizers and  insecticides. This would  have  been satisfactory in itself,but 
the  main criticism of the  "green revolution"  comes  under another heading.  It · 
is connected with  the difficulties in social organisation;  and  the  FAO  deplores 
"the general ineffectiveness of rural institutions and  the  public  services 
provided for farmers".  It ap:pears,in fact,  that the  "green revolution"  brought 
its benefits essentially to  the  big agricultural operators,to the detriment of 
the main body of farmers.  Nost  of the  Third Vlorld  countries did not  succeed 
in "arousing the  interest of  the rural population  throug h  education,con-
sumption and  stimulus".  "The  few  new  agrarian farm  programmes  put in hand  in 
recent years were  often of  limited scope". 
11Nor was  there  much  success in 
integrating the  small  farmer  and  the  outcast  population in rural areas into 
the general social and  economic  framework for  purposes  of development".  It 
must  be  emphasised,too,that  the higher yields which  resulted from  the  "green 
revolution"  techniques  involved costs on a  comparatively high level,especially 
in the  last few  years.  The  truth is,that these  techniques  require  the  use  of 
agricultural machinery,fertilizers,insecticides,irrigation systems,oil and 
much  else,an  overwhelmingly  large part of which has  to be  obtained from 
abroad.  The  "green revolution"  therefore,  increased the  extent  to which 
developing countries depend  on  the developed. - 19-
Food aid called in guestion 
Another explanation is advanced  of  the  precariousness of the Third 
World's  food  position.  It lies in the part  played by  the  food  aid distributed 
by  the  wealthy countries.  Since  1964  the amount  of this aid has  varied between 
$1  000  and  $  1  500  million at current prices;  and it has  to be admitted  the 
"real" amount  of the aid has  fallen very seriously.  In 1964 dollars the aid 
amounted  to $1  400  million,but in 1973 it was  only$  500  million.  The  FAO 
experts consider the  real volume  of the aid  ought to be  raised to $5  000  million 
annually.  Subject to this it might  be  thought  the  countries not .cov.eri:r:g their 
own  requirements  should be  glad and grateful that aid is granted  them  by  those 
who  can afford it,even if part of it is repayable.  This is not  the real truth. 
fhere  can of course  be  absolutely no  doubt  of  the value  of emergency aid in 
mitigating the  impact  of a  calamity;  but apart from  this,some  people wonder 
whether it is not a  poisoned  cup the wealthy nations are handing to their 
partner;:>  of  the  Third  World.  Through  the sixties the developed countries  put 
their food aid to the Third World  onto  a  systematic basis;  and it is open  to 
argument  that they were  thus  competing with local produce and  taking the sting 
out  of the  incentive to grow  more.  Food  aid was  originally designed -- the EEC 
Commission  is currently waging ferocious  war against this concept-- as a  way 
of getting rid of the surpluses in rich countries,and this may  well have dis-
couraged  production in the developing ones.  It is now  too  late to recover  the 
mistakes  of  the  past,but at least the developed countries  should  learn their 
lesson.  Nowadays,in any  case,  nobody  thinks  of questioning the  need for food 
aid.  The  countries  of  the  Third  1iorld are confronted with a  very serious 
solvency problem.  Only with very great difficulty could  they indulge in the 
luxury of long-term delivery contracts,as  the Russians did with the Americans 
in October 1975.  This  Moscow  agreement  covers an annual delivery to  the Soviets 
of  6  million tonnes  of American wheat  and  maize. 
The  world  food  Conference 
Food  aid was  made  into a  precise and  definite undertaking at the world 
food  Conference  in Rome  in November  1974.  The  wealthy countries undertook to 
supply each year not  less than 10 million tonnes  of cereals. This·is the first 
time  a  target has  been laid down  in volume  and not  in value,and represents in 
itself important  progress.  The  Conference also  took three other significant 
steps  : 
- formation of world food  council.  1'his  Council  was  set up  in June  1975, 
foiiowing_a_stormy-meeting:at-which it was  feared for a  time  there would  be 
a  full-scale  rupture between the developed and  the  developing  countries.  '.l.'he 
mandate  of  the  Council is to  coordinate  the activities of international organ-
isations and act as general  policy coordinator regarding food  production, 
nutrition,security of supply and  food aid.  The  new  organisation has  been 
dubbed  the  security council  of hunger;  but  nobody  has  a  righ~ of veto. 
- formation of an international development  fund.This  fund  would  have  the  task 
of-coiiecting-funds-received-by-way-of-voiuntary  contri~utions to agri-
cultural development  in the Third World.  It should  be  given a  contribution 
of $1  000  million by  the oil countries and  the developed  countries. - 20-
international commitment  regarding food  security.This project is based  on co-
ordination-of-national-food-storage-policies;-inter-governmental consultation 
on  the  level of stocks;  assistance to developing countries  to  enable  them  to 
carry out effectively their storage and  production programmes;  and  a  system of 
information and  quick alerts. Up  to now  this programme  has  not  been brought 
into effect. Its operation might  be  badly hindered if countries as  important 
as USSR  and  China  persist in regarding information about  their a~riculture as 
confidential. 
In the raw  material negotiations  between North and South,this  problem 
of food  security -- especially the storage policies -- should  be  regarded as 
specially important. 
VI.  THE  l!.CONOMIC  AND  MONETARY  CRISIS  :  A TROUBLED  WORLD  •=•--•m•====-=============a=======••====••========= 
The  raw  material negotiations between the developed and  the developing 
countries will be  taking place in a  remarkably disturbed  economic  and  monetary 
environment.  The  developed  countries are wondering about  the  scope and  duration 
of the recovery which is just becoming  perceptible.  The  developing countries 
are powerless to do  anything about  the  dramatic worsening of  their external 
accounts.  Only  the oil countries -- or at any rate the richer of  them -- are 
managing  to keep comparatively serene;  but  even they cannot sit by unperturbed 
about  the  ~nternational monetary uncertainties and the fate of their developed 
and developing partners. 
A problematic recovery 
The  recovery so  impatiently awaited by  the western governments will not 
be  like other recoveries.  The  worst  depression since the  war,in which  the  GNP 
of the  OECD  fell  2.%  and  the number  of unemployed  climbed  to  15  million,has 
necessarily left its scars.  The  individual countries are emerging from  it-~  one 
at a  time and  in no  special order.  In the middle  of  1975  economic activity had 
already shown  some  recovery in the United States and Japan;  while in  ~urope, 
France and  Germany  are  the  only ones among  the bigger countries which  may  be 
following in their footsteps  in 1976.  Both Great Britain and Italy will have 
to go  on  putting the accent  on  prices,trade balances and stability generally. 
Since  the  timing of recovery is spread out  country by country,  the western 
economy  will not  enjoy the  "multiplier effect" which results from different 
countries having their economic  cycles at the  same  time.  If there is to be a 
lasting expansion it is quite possible the governments will be  forced  to  open 
further recovery budgets.  This will largely depend  on  the behaviour of con-
sumers  who  are still showing  their preference for continued saving;  and also 
on  the behaviour of investors who  believe the crisis bogey has  not been finally 
exorcised and are chary of indulging in investment expenditure.  It looks as 
though the recovery,if recovery indeed there is, will be  much  more  moderate 
than was  the  case in earlier economic  cycles.  There is at present nothing to 
show  whether measures  which  may  be  taken to support continued economic 
act:l,vity,will not have  damaging effects in or after 1976.  This will,in any case, 
be  a  year in which unemployment  is expected to continue rising,because of the 
low  rate of growth forecast for  the  early future and  the large  proportion of 
unutilised production capacity. - 21-
and  galloping inflation 
There are other reasons  for anxiety about  the  prospects for  OECD 
countries.  Recovery measures  have  been  taken while  the inflation had  not 
been brought  completely under control;  and  the  OECD  countries are  coming  out 
of the recession with consumer  prices rising at an annual  rate  of about  ~~, 
which is admittedly only half the  1974  maximum,but  is nonetheless double 
the average  rate during the sixties. It is obvious  that,with things in this 
state,most of  the  governments will not  be  able  to go  straight  on with their 
recovery  programmes, because  of  the risk of a  new  price boom  which wou.ld 
oblige them  to slow  down  the growth process.  1'here  would  also be  the risk 
of increasing the external deficit of the  OECD  area after its slight con-
traction in 1975.  The  current deficit in 1975  was  apparently around$  6  000 
million,which compares  with $33  500 million in 1974.  It is likely to grow 
wider in 1976  and  the  OECD  estimate for the whole  area it covers is  ~17 500 
million. 
The  western governments are walking  the  tight-rope.- The. recovery 
for which they hoped  has  got  to be  kept  seriously under control for fear 
of yet another sideslip in prices and  trade balances.  This very control 
might  easily stop the recovery in activity from  taking hold;  and  these very 
precarious conditions in the  economies  of the West  cannot fail to make  it 
more  difficult to negotiate with developing  countries which are putting in 
their claims for financial assistance.  The  coin,however,  has its reverse side. 
These  same  conditions might  very well  strengthen the  wish  of developed 
countries  to get  the  raw  material markets  under control.  '.l:hey  cannot afford 
the  luxury of another price boom  which  would  seriously prejudice the efforts 
they have  made  to  put their economic  house  in order. 
A necessity for the Third World  :  ligger export receipts 
It is here  that we  come  to  the very heart of  the  contradrction between 
the attitudes of developed and  developing  countries~  ~he former would  like 
to  see  raw  material prices kept at the  1975  level,which has  been reached 
after the  material falls from  the  1974  peaks.  The  developing countries,on 
the other hand,  have  practically no  other way  to avoid  being financially 
stifled,except by  increasing their export  receipts which,as  everybody knows, 
are almost  80  "  dependent  on  their sales of raw  materials.  ~ie  must  allow for 
the fact  that  the countries of  the  Third World  in general and  excluding the 
oil countries,  have  taken a  very hard  knock  from  the way  the crisis worked 
out.  Their aggregate  current  trading deficit rose  from  $2  500  million in 
1973  to $17  500  million in 1974  and  no  less  than $  27  000 million in 1975. 
The  OECD  experts forecast a  slight improvement  in 1976,but nevertheless 
they expect  the deficit to  be $21  500 million.  The  Annual  Report  of the 
World  Bank  issued in September  1975  does  not  conceal its pessimism regarding 
the  economic  future  of developing countries which are not  oil producers. 
"If the developing countries as a  whole,are  to  reach an annual  growth-rate 
of  6%  by 1980 -- and  this is the rate needed for a  reasonable  degree  of 
economic  and social development  --and if they are to do  it entirely by 
inc~easing the  incoming supplies of capital,it will be  necessary for  this 
infJo.,  to  be  on a  massive  scale.  In fact  the  sums  needed  would  have  to go - 22-
far beyond  any  probable  estimates,even on  the assumption that  there is 
rapid economic  growth in the industrial countries",the World  Bank  says. 
In point  of fact "it cannot be  hoped  that additional capital inflows 
on  so  large a  scale will in fact  occur".  }'or a  growth-rate of  6 % "to be 
secured solely by increasing the flow  of public development  aid from  the 
wealthier  OECD  countries, it would  be  necessary for the aid given on  favourable 
terms  to increase  to  0.81%  of the  GNP  of the latter countries.  In fact  the 
available projections show  th§t  the  flow  of aid on favourable  terms  may  not 
by 1980 be more  than 0.24%  of  the GNP,despite  the fact  that  the figures  showed 
an improvement  in 1974  and  some  of the countries have  stated they will be 
keeping their official public aid at a  high level,or even  increasing it.  " 
If it be  added,that  private firms  in the West  are at present  shy of  investing 
in the Third World  and  thus depriving the  poorer countries of any  inflow of 
capital, while  the indebtedness of these developing countries can scarcely 
be  increased beyond its present  level,there is only one  possibility left.This 
is to increase  the  export earnings.  'l'his  is where  we  put  a  finger  on  the  stake 
which is being played for,both in Nairobi and  in Paris.  During  the  past 18 
months  there have  been  two  factors  telling against the developing countries 
the fall in the value of their exports and  the deterioration in their terms 
of trade  (through the rise in the  costs  of  their imported manufactures and 
without even mentioning the rise in oil prices). The  representatives of  these 
countries in Nairobi and Paris will have  the  job of ventillating this two-fold 
adversity. 
Financial rescue  plans 
Measures  have  been taken on an international footing  to  provide  some  degree 
of relief for  the countries of  the  Third  Worl~ but  those decided upon  in 
Jamaica  by the  IMF  Interim Committee  in Jan~ry 1976  are still on only a 
modest scale.  Their main  provisions were  : 
- setting up  of a  fiduciary,or,.trustee fund.  This fund  would  be  derived from 
the sale of  one  sixth of  the  gold stocks held by the  IMF.  It is estimated 
that  these would  bring in some  $400-500 million annually,and .this would  be 
turned over in the form  of loans  to countries where  the  income  per head 
does not  exceed $351. 
the  enlargement  of the  I~& credit tranches should  enable  developing 
countries to secure additional support  of $2  000 million. 
-a "third counter"  (target:  $  225  million from voluntary contributions) 
would·enable  the  loans given by  the World  Bank  to be  made  cheaper.  The 
normal  interest rate in January 1976  was  8.5%. 
The  countries with surpluses had set up an emergency  fund  in the  UNO 
framework  ($3  000 million)  to  provide  succour for such developing countries 
as were  most  affected by  the  food  crisis and  the oil crisis. It should also 
be noted  that  the "oil facilities"  of the  HIF  (amounting to 5  000  million 
Special Drawing Rights in 1975)  available to countries  suffering prejudice 
from  the rise in oil prices  (whether they be developed  countries or not)  will 
no  longer be available in 1976.  Most  of  the resources  mentioned here are 
repayable,and it would  be  difficult indeed  to  use  them  to solve  the finance 
problems  of developing countries during the next few  years,especially if the - 23-
World  Bank's forecasts  on  the  volume  of  public aid  to  the Third viorld  from 
OECD  countries should  prove  correct.  In 1974  the aid was  far short of the 
target of 0.7%  of  the  GNP  to  be  provided as  public aid,which had  been laid 
down  at the beginning of  the seventies as  part of  the  "second development 
decade"  of UNO.  In 1974  the  lending countries of  OECD  provided $11  300  million 
for developing countries.  This was  0.33%  of their GNP,or  slightly more  than 
in 1973  (0.30%)  which had,however,  fallen from  0.31%  in 1971.  The  developing 
countries can,nevertheless,  count  on  further support  from  the oil countries, 
from  which  the financial aid for development is proportionately more  ample 
than that of  the western industrial nations,amounting to  l.~fo of their GNP, 
or $2  500  million.  The  oil countries,of course,  are financially flourishing, 
even  though their external surplus is trending downwards.  Their record  surplus 
on  current account  of  ~67 000  million in 1974,  receded in 1975  to $43  000 
million,but  even this is not exactly poverty.  For 1976  the  OECD  experts fore-
cast an  improvement  to about $46  500  million. 
The  oil countries are very worried about  the deterioration in the 
international currency position.  It was  they  \especially Saudi Arabia)  who 
insisted that  the  North-South  dialo5~e in Paris should  include a  committee 
specially appointed to consider financial  and  monetary questions.  The  countries 
with big surpluses are afraid the fluctuating quotations for the dollar --
which is,after all, the principal currency for international settlements --
may  result in a  shrinkage in the  real value  of their assets,  more  especially 
the short-term placings they have  made  in western markets.  In general,too,  the 
considerable swings in the value of the dollar,which three ¥ears discussion 
has  not yet  brought~ to an end,  are a  matter of  concern for all the  raw  material 
industries. Floating exchange  rates may  result in a  miscarriage in profit 
calculations and are  thus an obstacle  to  the  international investment  which, 
for raw  materials  production,  is considerable.  They  are a  continual disturbance 
to  international trade  and  they encourage  speculation.  In all sorts of ways 
they make  commodity  agreements more  complex,especially when  these  provide for 
a  !'price fork"  or range  of maximum  and  minimum  prices. After all,was it not 
because of prices stated in dollars which had  been devalued,that  the  coffee 
agreement  was  denounced  by  the  producers  in 1971. - 24-
PART  II - STABILISING  THE  MARKETS 
1.  -Commodity  a~reements 
2.  - Stabilisation of export receipts 
3.- Indexes  or sliding-scales 
4.  - UNCTAD'S  "integrated prograiiUile" - 25-
I.  COMMODITY  AGREEMENTS  :  OR  STABILISATION  A LA  CARTE  -------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------
Prices are the central factor in all discussions about  raw  materials. 
In 1973-74 it w~s the  price explosions which really set  these discussions  going. 
The  problem of prices is one  which has  three aspects  : 
chronic instability. The  market  prices are more  volatile:.in some  cases  than 
others,but this instability is disliked,both by  the  developing countries and 
bythe developed.  The  former live in economic  systems which depend  very 
heavily on  the receipts  (both from  the export  trade and froa taxation)  derived 
from  raw  materials;  and because  these  prices are so unreliable  they are not 
able to  launch into continuing investment  programmes  as they would  wish.  In 
some  degree  the  swings  in price  prevent  them  from identifying their own 
economic  hori~on. For the developed countries which are importers  of  raw 
materials,the reasons for disliking excessive fluctuations are quite different. 
They  fear the  inflationary pressures which are associated with rising prices; 
and  this is an anxiety which is particularly keen just now.  Finally the 
unstable prices bring a  major inconvenience which is common  both  to  the  dev-
eloping and  the developed countries.  They  upset  the whole  process of prog-
ramming  investment in the  raw  material industry itself. This creates a  lack 
of elasticity in the adjustments of demand  and  supply,and  thus inevitably 
leads  to excessive fluctuations in prices. 
- the absolute levels of the  prices lead  ,as may  well be  supposed,  to  a  diverg-
ence  of opinions between  the Third World  and  the developed  countries.  For 
a  long time  the former  countries have  been complaining that their export 
produce  was  being sold at unremunerative  prices.  The  developed countries,on 
the other hand,  are responsible for a  very large part of  the world's  imports 
of  these  products and their tendency is much  more  to  look for supplies at 
a  lower cost.  A compromise  between the  two  groups  of countries is necessary 
if anybody is to settle prices which will be  both "equitable" for consumers 
and  "remunerative
11  for producers.  In parallel with the  fundamental  price 
question commodity agreements  have  a  second important function.  This is,the 
guarantee of supply to  the  consuming  countries which sign the agreements. 
In practice there is a  whole  range  of expedients for getting the  markets 
under control,not only to eliminate excessive fluctuations,but also to ascertain 
and  secure a  level of prices satisfactory both to  consumers  and  to  producers. 
These  commodity  agreements differ widely in the §rrangements  they specify.  One 
can in fact talk of commodity  agreements  as  soon as there is a  concerted approach 
between  consumers  and  producers,whatever be tts form and  whatever be  the  com-
pulsive  elements.  The  following  enumeration of the chief instruments for 
stabilising raw  material markets is in the ascending order of the generally 
recognised effectiveness. 
Exchanges  of information 
and-consumers-hold-regular 
on  the  prospects of growth 
or compulsion,but meetings 
side being  cau~ht unawares. 
this is the minimum.  Representatives of  producers 
meetings  to exchange  the  most  recent information 
in supply and  demand.  There  is no  real constraint 
of this kind are often useful in preventing either -:- 26-
- 1nf1Y~ng~gg_g~~ng :this is primarily a  matter of making it easier for a 
product  to  come  into  the consumer market.  Instances are  the reduction,or 
even elimination,  of consumption taxes which  often add  unduly to  the  price 
of a  product and discourage  buying.  Trade  promotion is another possibility. 
- fr~£~_£Qnf2rm~!~ :  producers and  consumers  agree  on  minimum  export prices, 
subject to  possible adjustment if the  price  proves  to be  out  of line. It is 
also possible to  lay down  not  only a  minimum  price,but also a  "price fork", 
or range  of price maxima  and  minima.  The  prices are always  purely indic-
ative,except when  specific machinery is provided to ensure conformity by 
operations in the market. 
- L2~=:t~::.:m~~sm:t::.:f!~:t~  :in these  cases both producer and  consumer  make  mutual 
commitments.  The  former  undertake to deliver specified quantities and  the 
latter undertake  to buy  them.  A contract of this type may  contain a  price 
clause.  They  may  be  bilateral (i.e. between  two  national governments), 
regional  (between  two  groups  of countries)  or multilateral  (between  the 
majority of producers and  consumers).  There are certain problems inherent 
in arriving at these  contracts.  It is not  easy  to forecast  supply and 
demand,especially for a"ricultural produce;  and  governments  (specially in 
the West  where  private firms  play so  important a  part) are not always  in 
a  position to fulfil such commitments  in their entirety. 
- ~:E~E!_~~~!~~ : the principle here is to fix export  quotas for  the producers 
and  vary their amount  in accordance with the  prices quoted for the  product. 
On  a  rising market  the national quotas are usually enlarged stage by  stage, 
or even eliminated altogether.  On  a  falling market  the  quotas are  prog-
ressively cut;  and if there are fears  of a  collapse in prices,it is even 
possible to ban exports altogether. Action on  these  lines resolutely con-
trolling the  supply enables  prices to  be  kept within a  determined  range  or 
fork.  It is not  invariably to the advanta"e  of exporters who,if the  prices 
should fall,bear the whole  economic  and  social  ~oat of  the  operation. 
,;,.Buf!az:_s:tQcks  :  a  buffer stock is undoubtedly  the most  effective way  of 
stabilising markets.  It is also a  method  which can be  extremely costly,either 
because  the  product is itself expensive  (copper)  or there may  be  a  wastage 
problem if it has  to be kept more  than a  certain length of  time  (coffee, 
cocoa).  The  stock can be  an instrument for defending both maxima.:::.and,minima 
When  prices rise some  of  the stock is released;  and  when  the movement  is 
the other way  the stock is reconstituted.  Such  stocks  can be  mana~ed on 
a  national or an international basis,the latter being the  method  offering 
the greater security.  It is important to choose a  level of prices not far 
distant from  the  long-term equilibirium which is not always  easy to define. 
If target prices are set  too  high,they would  quickly lead to de-stocking 
and if they are set too  low  they would  promote  stock-piling -- unless  prices 
are to  be  allowed to move  temporarily "outside  the fork"  and  unless  the 
stock policy is linked with machinery for export  quotas.  UsuallY./  if the 
scheme  is to  be  effective, the stocks must  be  not  less  than three months 
consumption in the participating countries.  The  logical function of a 
buffer stock is to defend  the  price,but  there is no  reason why  the arr-
ar~ement should not  be  more  flexible.  For example,the  price  curve might 
be  smoothed  by  "conjunctural stocks" which would  not  need  to be  so big 
as a  buffer stock.  Such stocks  would  not  be  defending  the  scale of prices - 27-
laid down  in advance,but  simply smoothing out  the unduly wide-fluctuations. 
Another possibility is for an  a~reement with a  buffer stock and a  price fork 
to be rounded  off with a  clause guaranteeing deliveries to  consumers.  In this 
case the buffer stock might  be accompanied by  specific reserve stocks for 
the  express  purpose of dealing with any serious supply shortage. Another 
possibility would  be a  clause by which exporters would  be  obliged to give 
priority for deliveries to  consumers  who  are signatories to the agreement. 
In the  event of a  temporary shortage, it would also be  possible to fix 
import quotas within which  supplies would  be delivered at the  upper limit 
of the price fork,or even slightly above it. 
- ~i~n~i~l-in§!rYm~n1~ :  other possibilities include export or import to 
taxes,the product of which would  be  earmarked for specific  purposes,such 
as financing a  buffer stock,marketing or sales promotion or  diversif~cation 
measures. 
Finance 
The  next  question is how  to choose  among  all these  techniques.  Every-
thing depends  from  the outset  on whether  consumers  and  producers really want 
to act jointly. This -brings us  by a  roundabout  route to  the  question of what 
the  agreements cost.  Obviously if nobody  wants  to put up any money,the  most 
that will be  possible will be  periodic meetings without any stockpiling.  The 
financing of the  agree~ents is a  key  problem.  A well balanced agreement will 
need to have  contributions both from  consumers  and producers,but  this is not 
always  the  case.  Funds  could also be raised from  private sources  (e.g.  from 
a  banking consortium)  or by an offer of bonds  to  the  public.  The  World  Bank, 
for  example,  has stated it will give  sympathetic  consideration to any proposal 
for stock finance. 
The  HIF, too,  has started a  "facility for financing international stocks" 
This was  set up  in 1969,and enables raw material exporting countries to re-
finance  any contributions they may  make  to international stock-holding arrange-
ments.  These  loans are given at specially low  interest rates,and are for a 
maximum  period of five years,but their granting is subject to a  number  of 
conditions.Tlia=&pPlicant,country must  produce evidence  of balance  of payments 
difficulties;  part of the financing for  the  stock must  come  from  sources  other 
than those connected with the  I~Th,;  and  the  loans are limited to 5qS  of  the 
I  . 
applicant country s  IMF  quota.  It must,however,  be  admitted  that very little 
of the  3  000  million SDR  at the  I~&'s disposal has  yet been used,for the very 
simple  reason that the number  of  commodity  agreements with provision for 
international stocks is extremely limited;  but this does not  mean  that this 
facility may  not  become  popular in the future. 
Survey of agreements made 
To  some  extent  the financing  problem conditions  the  others;  but beyond 
this there are a  number  of factors which determine  the choice between  the 
various  commodity  agreement  techniques.  These  depend  on  the  product itself --
for a  buffer  stock would  not suit a  fruit agreement and  an agreement  on  timber 
or hides and  leather raises  problems  of definition and comparative  prices to 
cover a  great number  of sorts,descriptions and  categories.  Problems  may  also -~-
arise from  individual commodity  markets,for the  open market  prices are 
often not  wholly representative. 
The  techniques  listed are sometimes  used in combined  form,and  in 
this way  a  number  of commodity  agreements  have  been made,though few  of 
them  include really compulsive  market disciplines. Just at this moment 
when  the  international community  has mobilised  to attack the  raw materials 
problem,it has  to be  recognised  that it will find  no  encouragement  by a 
scrutiny of the  past.  The  most it can hope  for is val~ble information; 
for 1975  was  a  bumper year,with renewals  for three  of these agreements --
coffee,cocoa and  tin. 
Before beginning a  survey of the  commodity agreements actually in 
existence at the beginning of 1976,summary mention  must  be  made  of a  large 
number  of arrangements mainly limited to  exchanges  of information,and in 
some  cases market disciplines  of  ~.~  ..  very flexible kinds.  These  include  : 
- tea  :  Unofficial agreement  (1970)  under FAO  auspices  providing for fixing 
of-export quotas.which have not yet checked  the  long-term downward  trend 
in prices  ; 
- jute  :  informal arrangement  of 1968,also under FAO  auspices,providing 
indicative maximum  and  minimum  prices within which  market  prices have not 
always  been kept,especially in 1974.  There is a  similar agreement for sisal, 
which also  provides for the  fixing of export quotas,but this has  been no 
more  successful than  the arrangements  made  for  jute; 
- rubber  :  exchanges  of information about natural and synthetic rubber in an 
international working party in which  both consumers  and  producers are rep-
resented; 
tungsten and  manganese  :  regular exchanges of views  between  producers and 
consumers-are-organised in a  committee  under the autl.ority of the UNCTAD 
secretariat; 
- dairy products  :  there are  three international arrangements  currently in· 
force:-The-first deals with powdered  full-cream milk  (OBCD  1963);  the 
second with powdered  skim  (GATT  1969)  and  the  third with butter-oil and 
butyric fatty substances  (GATT  1973). All  three cases  cover the fixing of 
minimum  export  prices,but the  market effects of these  have  never been fully 
tested,because  the actual prices have  always  been higher than those  laid 
down  ; 
~~lead and  zinc  inter-government  consultative groups  have  been set up under 
fiN-auspices-; 
- olive oil  :  the  1963  agreement  between a  limited number  of countries is 
aimed-at-exchange  of  information and  sales  promotion.  The  agreement  was 
renewed  for five  years  from  the beginning of  1974.  It includes a  propaganda 
fund  to be  applied in sales  promotion. 
These  are all arrangements  rather than formal  agreements,and for  the 
most  part their effects on  the  market  have  not  been decisive.  In certain other 
products  producers and  consumers  have  sought  to go  further  than simple 
exchanges  of  information.  To  this end  they have  earmarked resources for 
attaining the  much  desired market  stabilisation,but  the results have  not  been 
conclusive.  Most  of these agreements are  now  a  deadletter,and all that is - 29-
left is a  permanent secretariat.  In some  cases the setbacks  have  been due  to 
the refusal of major consuming  countries  (the  USA  for cocoa,the  EEC  for  sugar) 
to take  part.  These  must  be discussed separately  : 
- the wheat  agreement  :  the world wheat  market  has  been subject to inter-
national-agreements since 1949,usuallY for three years at a  time.  Over  the 
period  the substance of these agreements  has  passed  through important  changes. 
In the sixties  the  agreements defined a  price fork,inside which  importing 
countries undertook to make  part of their purchases from exporters who  were 
signatories to the agreements.  The  latter undertook to cover the  commercial 
requirements of the importers  concerned.  Fundamentally  these  agreements were 
a  guarantee of supplies at reasonable costs.  The  fact  that  they operated 
reasonably well was  due  to  the  production and  storage policies of  the  United 
States and Canada.  wnen  the agreement  came  up for renewal  in 1967,there was 
a  decision to insert additional clauses.  The ·major  problem at that  time 
was  to unload  the surpluses of the world's big producers.  The  1967  agreement 
contains  two  sections -- one  on the food aid commituents  of exporting 
countries;  and  the other on  the  mechanics  of the market  itself,including 
the fixing of a  minimum  price.  In practice,however,  this agreement did not 
stand up  to  events;  and  with  the surplus supplies in the  market  the minimum 
export  price was  a  mere  illusion. Against this background,when it came  to 
the 1971  renewal  the 1967  text had  to be  renegotiated altogether.  The  food 
aid convention was  retained,and in 1975 it was  continued afresh;  but  there 
was  a  new  convention on  the  trade in wheat,the old  one  being completely 
empty of its contents and  left without any  economic  clause whatever.  This, 
too,was  continued in 1975,so that the  world  market  for wheat,most  strategic 
of all the strategic products,  is left to  the free  play of demand  and  supply. 
The  fact  that  the agreement is still in existence has  enabled  the inter-
national wheat  Council  to survive.  This  body  has its seat in London  and is 
a  forum  throug~ which  consumers and  producers  can exchange  useful infor-
mation on  production;trade and stocks. 
the sugar agreement  :  nothing is left of  the  1968 Geneva  agreement,except 
a:-skeleton-staff:-rt came  up for renegotiation in 1973,but this attempt  was 
a  failure.  The  economic  clauses contained in the  1968  texts do  not  now  apply. 
These texts  included the  fixing of adjustable export  quotas  for keeping 
prices inside a  predetermined fork;  national stocks were  required  to be 
between 10 and  15  fo  of free market  exports;  in time of shortage  (with prices 
at the upper limit of  the fork)  exporters were  required  to deliver specific 
quantities of  sugar to  importers who  were  party to  the  agreement;  there  were 
special clauses to  take account of conditions in developing countries; 
importers undertook to give priority in securing their supplies to  producers 
who  were  parties to  the  agreement. 
The  agreement  worked  quite well at first;  but after 1971 it served  no 
practical purpose.  This  was  _because  it applied only to a  small  proportion 
of world  trade.  Neither the  EEC  nor the United States was  a  party to it. 
, The  big importers  (USA,UK  and  USSR)  all had contracts with  producing 
countries,providing guaranteed  purchases  and  guaranteed prices.  When 
suppliers had  surpluses  they dumped  them  on  the  open market  and  put  the 
prices  immoderately down.  In 1971  the  downward  price  tendency went  into - 30-
reverse,and it was  the preferential delivery contracts which  were  now 
least scrupulously fulfilled.  With  the help of speculators sugar prices 
soared to peaks  in 1974  and  began their reaction sometime  after those  of 
most  other raw  materials.  The  free market  has  now  regained its importance, 
because,  at the  end  of 1974  the United States did  not  renew  their supply 
contract with their usual  suppliers. It is,nevertheless,  a  very disorganised 
market. 
The  EEC  withdrew  from  the  talks preparatory to renegotiating the  agreement 
in 1973,but it has  made  an important gesture  to safeguard  the interests of 
Commonwealth  developing  countries which are producers  of sugar and  have 
since 1951  had  the advantages  of the  Commonwealth  Sugar Agreement  giving 
them  guaranteed outlets at guaranteed  prices in the British market.  In the 
Lome  C.onvention  the EEC  undertakes  (without  tiue-limit)  to buy  1.2 million 
tonnes  of  cane  sugar every year from  the ACP  producing countries.  This 
affects 13  of  these countries,the chief among  which are  ~~uritius,Fiji, 
Guyana  and Jamaica.  ~ach exporting country is ,given a  delivery quota and 
undertakes  to  conform to it. The  guaranteed  prices are negotiated  annua~ly.  ·  ~~=-~~~~~-~~~==~=~~ :  the first cocoa agreement  was  signed in 1972.  It 
was  never operational because  world market  prices rose  too high.  A new 
agreement  was  _negotiated in October 1975 at Geneva.  Its provisions are not 
unlike  those  of its predecessor,but there have  been various adjustments. 
This new  agreement,which is scheduled  to  come  into force in October 1976 
is based  on  two  principal provisions.  fhe first  is,t~t exports will be. 
subject to a  quo~a fixed  each year;  and  the second,that there should  be  a 
buffer stock not  exceeding 250  000  tonnes.  The  stock is to  be  financed  by 
a  levy of  1  cent  (U~)  per lb.  This  tax has in fact been collected since 1972, 
and has brought  in some  $80 million.  Those  in charge  of  the agreement, 
however,  have  not yet been able  to build up  the buffer stock,purchases for 
which in a  market with prices already deemed  unduly high,  would  have  pushe~ 
them  up still further.  The  fixing of  quotas for ·each  exporter,combined with 
the buffer stock machinery is intended  to defend a  price fork of between 
39 and  55  cents  per lb. A feature is the  laying down  of price ranges  inside 
the fork within which  the intervention  techniques  can operate in specific 
ways 
39  - 42 
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buffer stock may  enter market as a  buyer for quantities 
not  exceeding  4%  of annual  quotas 
quotas  to be strictly observed; 
no  market  intervention,but  producers  may  export without  limit; 
buffer stock to defend  ceiling price,and may  sell up  to  7% 
of annual quotas. 
There  is a  risk of serious prejudice to the agreement  from  the attitude 
of the  United States,which is the world's biggest  importer  (22.9,fo)  and 
refuses  to  be  associated with  the agreement.  Moreover,  the  Ivory Coast, 
which is the· world's  third largest producer,is understood  to be  reluctant 
about  signing an agreement  which  lays  down  prices it does  not consider 
sufficiently remunerative. - 31  -
- !g~-£~ff~~-~i~~~~~~! : the first coffee agreement  was  made  in 1968.  It came 
to grief in 1971  because  of  the refusal of consumers  to allow for the de-
valuation of  the dollar in their  price~fixing procedure.  The  economic 
clauses of the agreement were  the essential ones;  but  even  without  them it 
was  extended up  to  1975.  In December  of that year a·  new  agreement  was  signed 
at the  premises  of  the  International Coffee Council in London.  It is more 
flexible  than its predecessors and  sets up  an arithmetical relationship 
which was  not in the earlier agreement,between prices and  the size of the 
export  ~uotas. If market  prices rise beyond  15%  above  the agreed ceiling 
price,the quotas are automatically suspended. 
There was  also a  change in the way  quotas are calculated. This is designed 
to avoid any country's share of world coffee  production being fixed  in a  way 
which will make  it permanent.  Before this the  basic  ~uotas were  proportional 
to  the  production of each country;  but  now  only  7~fo of their quotas will 
be fixed  this way  and  the  other 3o%  will be  awarded  by  reference to  the 
national stocks.  This  new  system should discourage exporters  from  dumping 
massive  surpluses into the world market.  Instead,they will be  encouraged 
to build up  stocks,and this should  make  for a  less volatile market.  The 
agreement  indeed  provides for  the  collection of a  small tax,the  product 
of which will be  paid into a  Voluntary Promotion Fund.  These  should make  it 
possible  to finance a  sales  promotion campaign in the importing countries. 
~he new  agreement is to  come  into force in October 1976. 
- the tin agreement  :  the first tin agreement dates  from  1956.  Since  then it 
has-been-regularly renewed;  and its current version,which came  into force 
in 1971,  expires  on  June  30  1976.  Negotiations for the fifth agreement  took 
place in 1975,and agreement has already been reached.  The  new  version is 
much  the  same  as its predecessor,except  on  one  point -- the size of  the 
buffer stock.  The  market  control system is the  most  elaborate yet brought 
into force.  There are four  fundamental  provisions  : 
1) buffer stock  :  since 1961  the volume  of the buffer stock has  been  20  000 
tonnes  of metallic tin.  Only  the  producing countries  (which are all dev-
eloping  countries~excpt Australia)  contribute  to setting up  the stock; 
and  in the fifth agreement  the scale of this stockpile is raised to 
40  000  tonnes.  Theoretically the total is divided into  two  parts.  The 
first 20  000  tonnes,like the existing stock,  is to be  provided by the 
producers alone;  and  the  other 20  000  tonnes  can be built up  by  the 
consuming countries,but only from voluntary contributions.  Up  to the 
present only France,the Netherlands  and  Belgium have let it be known 
that they were willing to make  their contribution to this stockpile. 
Indeed,France and  the Netherlands  had already done  this in 1971.  The 
fact  remains  that there is very little chance that the  20  000  tonne 
section depending  on  the  goodwill of consumers will be  effectively 
contributed. 
2)  ~~!=~=~!~~~-~~~~=~ :  the agreement  lays  down  that a  floor price and a 
ceiling price shall be  fixed by agreement  between  producers and  consumers 
meeting in the international tin Council,where their voting rights are 
e~ual. These  prices are to trigger the  intervention of  the stock organ-
isation. - 32-
3)  export control  :  when  intervention by  the stock does  not  suffice to keep 
market-prices-above the  floor,the Council may  decide  to initiate a  period 
of control.  This will in fact be a  matter of reducing the exports.  The 
rate of  reduction will be fixed for  each  co~ntry by  reference  to  the  trade . 
done  in the  period before  the initiation of control. 
4)  action in case  of shortage  :  the measures  envisaged are stimulants and 
are-not-automatic:-wEen-market prices are approaching the  ceiling,  the 
Council  recommends  producing countries  to do  everything  possible to 
increase  the supply.  It is also entitled to ask producers  to give  priority 
to supplying those  consumer countries  which are parties to  the agreement. 
The  tin agreement has  on  the  whole  worked  quite well.  Prices have  been 
kept at levels  regarded as  remunerative  in the developing countries  (~~laysia, 
Bolivia,Thailand and  Indonesia)  which account for most  of the world's  production. 
According to UNCTAD,the  terms  of  trade of tin-exporting developing countries  rose 
2.~b each year between 1955  and  1972.  This is specially worth recording,because 
most  of the  poorer countries  producing most  of the  other raw  materials suffered 
a  deterioration in their terms  of  trade  over  the  same  period.  The  fact  remains 
that just before  the fifth international tin agreement  came  up for renegotiation, 
the  UNCTAD  secretariat called attention to various  shortcomings  in the  way  the 
agreement  works.  Too  often,they said,  the adjustments  to  the  price fork were 
dictated by  changes  in the  market  price;  the  agreement  worked  better in defending 
the floor price  than the ceiling price,and this had  been the result of periods  of 
of export control which are a  heavy charge  upon  the  exporters;  prices laid down 
in the agreement  seldom  take  proper account  of  changes in production costs;  the 
negotiators did not make  any  radical changes  in the  terms  of  the  agreement,which 
would  have  called for sacrifices  on  the  part  of  the developed countries;  and  the 
developing countries  had  refused  to insert a  supply guarantee as  the  consumers 
had  begged  them  to  do.  It should  be  noted  that  two  important  countries are  outside 
the agreement,a  producer and  a  consumer.  These  are China and  the  United States and 
the latter has  a  stockpile of  200  000  tonnes,which is enough  to  put  the  operation 
of the agreement  completely out  of gear.  This risk has in fact  been  dispo~ed of 
to quite a  large extent  through a  tacit agreement  between  the  United States and 
'the  heads  of the  international tin Council.  In ;.)eptember  1975, too,  ~lr.  Henry 
Kissinger told  the extraordinary meeting of the  ITN  Assembly,that his country 
might ask for membership  of the agreement. 
II.  STABILISATION  OF  EXPORT  RECEIPTS  :  LOME  LEADS  THE  WAY  ----------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------
Commodity  agreements  are  intended  to stabilise prices and  thus  to 
stabilise the export  receipts  of  the developing countries by v<hich  the  raw 
materials are supplied.  They  do  not  always  succeed in this,for another require-
ment  is,that the quantities exported  should also be  comparatively steady. 
i·~a.chinery for stabilising export  receipts must  take  into account  both prices and 
quantities in the same  context.  The  stability target for  the  commercial  receipts 
of developing countries is a  potential remedy  for  the  endemic  problem of 
fluctuation which  : 
- puts  investment  planning out  of gear  :  a  sudden shrinkage in export  receipts 
leads-to-the-abandonment-or-suspension of  investment  projects in hand.  When 
the receipts  increase developing countries often fear  they  will  slump again 
and hesitate about  resuming their investment  projects,preferring instead to 
import  consumption goods  ; - 33-, 
- prejudice  the  internal balance in the  public finances  :  a  large part of  the 
Eudget-in-deveioping-countries-is-fed-directiy-or-indirectly by the  production 
of  raw  materials; 
upset the external payments  balances  :  if there is a  fall,sentiment  in the 
business-community-accentuates-the-Imbalance  of  the  payments,because a  number 
of phenomena  occur-- exodus  of capital,quicker payments  for imports and delays 
in bringing home  the receipts for goods  exported. 
Wide  possibilities 
The  action of stabilising export receipts for developing  countries is a 
way  of clearing their economic  horizons.  It will enable  them  to have  investment 
programmes  and stick strictly to  them;  and  thus  they will be able  to  plan their 
development  more  effectively.  There are many  ways  by which it can be done,for 
there are many  possible approaches.  How  many  countries are  to benefit -- all the 
developing  coun~ries or only  the  poorer ones  ?  What  exports are to be  covered --
all the  trade in goods  and services or simply the  goods  ?  ~hat destinations are 
to be  taken into account -- all destinations or only those  to the  countries which 
finance  the  scheme  ?  These  are only a  few  of the relevant questions. 
As  with commodity  agreements,the success  of  the  scheme  will largely depend 
on how  much  money  is to be  made  available for it. Here again a  number  of decisions 
need to be  made.  What  is to  be  the reference basis  to trigger the  interventions  ? 
Is action to be based  on  past  performance,on the amount  of the export in earlier 
years  ?  or on  performances  deemed  desirable,taking into account  the need for safe-
guarding developing'  countries against a  deterioration in their terms  of  trade ? 
Is the aid to be  given in the  form  of loans or grants ?  And  is it to be automatic ? 
As  always  in such cases,  the  choice of method  will depend  on the  scope  and 
effectiveness to be  sought.  Up  to  the  present we  know  of only  two  systems for 
stabilising export  receipts -- the  Lome  system which links the  EEC  with 46  countries 
in africa,the Caribbean and  the Pacific;  and  the  IMF  system.  These are  conceived 
on very different lines.  The  essential differences are four in number.  The  I¥& 
system covers all receipts for the  export  of goods,whereas  the stabex system in 
the  Lome  Convention covers  only exports  of a  precise list of  raw  materials.  The 
IMF  system operates exclusively in the  form  of loans,whereas stabex is l:?ased  on 
advances which,depending on the specific case,may or not be  repayable.  The  IMF 
system is available for all developing countries,whereas stabex is regional in 
scope,applying only to the 46  ACP  countries,among which however,  are included 
many  of the poorest countries  on  earth. '.lfhe  stabex system,too,  gives  these 
countries preferential treatment which  the  IMF  system does  not. 
The  IMF  system 
The  I~~ compensatiun scheme  was  introduced in 1963  and was  slightly amended 
in 1966.  Of  the  3  000  million SDR·made  available,only 1  000  million SDR  has  been 
effectively used.  At  the  end  of July 1975  the  outstandings were  56.8 million SDR. 
The  facility has  been used by  some  30  countries,but the amounts  have varied con-
siderably from  150 million SDR  for  India to  only 9.5 million SDR  for Burundi.  In 
1967  and in 1962  the loans were  particularly high.  The  compensation  (in the  form 
of 3-year or 5-year loans at fixed  rates of  interest)  kept  exclusively for  raw - 34-
materials  producers are granted  on  the basis of  th~ total export receipts.  They 
are made  available when  there has  been a  deficit in the  real value of exports in 
comparison with a  5-year period,of which  the year of application is the  third. 
The  figures for two  years,therefore, are 'projections.  The  country which  becomes 
a  debtor under this facility is encouraged  to.repay the  money  in advance,if and 
when  the value of its exports rises above  the  "norm". 
The  fact  that  ~eveloping countries have  made  little use  of this system 
is due_to  the operational rules being rather strict. Compensation is not  entirely 
automatic,and account  is taken of the whole  of  the  balance  of  payments.  The  amounts 
come  under  a  strict ceiling,depending on the applicant country's  Ilillf  quota  •  The 
price inflation leads to an artificial growth in the receipts.  The  granting of 
I~& loans is subject to administrative rules which developing countries are not 
always  able  to  comply with in good.time. 
The  I~& compensation finance  scheme,though it has  been rather rigid in 
it.s application so far,  may  nevertheless attract more  interest.  The  IMF  experts 
are considering how  it can be  made  more  flexible in ways  which would  make  it 
more  attractive as a  source of finance  to developing countries.  The  ministers 
belonging to  the  I~& Interim Committee,at  their meeting in January 1976,decided 
in principle,that the funds available to  the  scheme  should  be  increased by  1  000 
million SDR.o. 
The  "stabex system" 
The 
11stabex
11  system for  the stabilisation of export  receipts, is contained 
in the Lome  Convention,and has  been hailed alike in EEC  and  in ACP  countries as 
a  new  departure in relations setween developed and  developing countries.  The  system 
was  not  thought  out and  laid down  unilaterally by  the  Nine,but  was  a  product of 
negotiation between the European  and  the ACP  partners.  Stabex is to  earmark 
UA  375  million for five years for stabilising the  receipts to  the ACP  countries 
from  their exports  of raw  materials  (total of  29  products)  to  the  Community.  The 
volume  of the exports concerned  was  about  UA  2  000  million in 1973.  The  main 
features  of the scheme  are as follows  : 
- cover  :  a  se~ection of 29  products was  laid ~own,depending on  a  number  of 
criteria,including their importance in providing employment,the fluctU§tion in 
prices and  quantities delivered and  their economic  importance  to the ACP 
countries.  'J.'hey  include  groundnut  products,  cocoa,coffee,cotton,coir,palm and 
palm kernels,hides and  leather,timber products,fresh bananas,tea,raw sisal and 
iron ore. 
A number  of other products  (including copper,phosphates,bauxite and  tin),though 
some  of  the ACP  countries are concerned with  them,were  not  included in the list. 
All  the ACP  countries  have  the benefit  of the  guarantee,which is given in 
respect of each product  taken individually.  For a  country to receive  compensation 
the  product in question must  represent at least 7.5%  of  the  export  receipts  of 
the applicant country  (reduced  to  5%  for exporters of sisal and  2.5~ when  the 
raw  materials in question are exported by  one  of  the ACP  countries ranked as 
"least developed,land-locked or on an  island"~ 'rhere are  24  countries  on  the 
latter list. The  Community  guarantee is given in respect  of the amount  of  the - 35-
exports  consigned  to its own  member  countries.  To  this rule,too,  there is an 
exception,for the guarantee relates to exports  to all destinations  from 
Burundi,Guinea-Bissau,Rwanda and  Swaziland.  It is provided that  the list of 
products may  be  revised,but not before the  Lome  Convention has  been in force 
for a  year.  It is the Council  of Ministers  of  the Nine  European and  46  ACP 
countries which  has  authority to make  amendments. 
triggering of the machinery  :  a  reference figure is calculated by  which  the 
scale-of-any-loss-in-export  receipts can be  measured.  It is "the  moving  average 
of  the export receipts  procured  to each ACP  State by its exports  to  the 
Community  during the four years  preceding that  to which  the application relates". 
In other words  the  reference  level is defined by reference  to  past  performance. 
When  the amount  of the exports in any year is lower by 7.5%  than this reference 
level,the ACP  country concerned has a  right  to a  financial transfer.  This 
tolerance is reduced  to 2.5%  for  the list of the  poorest countries. 
- payment  of the  compensation  :  we  have  just seen that when  the  compensation 
threshold-is-reached:the-ACP  country concerned has  the  right  to a  transfer. 
This is practically automatic,but  the European Commission  which  carries a 
very considerable responsibility in managing this machinery,has  to  oar~y out 
various tests before the  contribution is paid over.  It has first to make  sure 
there has  been no  diversion of traffic. It might  happen,for example,that a 
country.knowing there is a  guarantee for  the  export receipts on  consignments 
to  the EEC,will have attempted' to sell its goods  outside  the  Community.  It 
would  thus be  procuring an artificial decrease in its receipts from  exports 
to the  Nine,and getting an undue  compensation.  The  European Commission  has 
also  to determine whether  the fall in the  relevant receipts  may  not have 
resulted from a  large increase in the local processing of raw  materials. 
If the right to the transfer is duly recognised,the European  Commission  may 
draw it from  the  UA  375  million which stands at the disposal of the  scheme. 
The  total amount  of these  contributions,however,  is subject  to a  maximum  of 
UA  75 million a  year.  In certain circumstances  the figure  may  be  exceeded, 
but this will reduce  the amounts  a~ailable in the following  ye~rs.  In the  same 
way  any balance  remaining at the  end  of  the  year is carried forward  to be 
available in the next. 
The  amount  of  the  indemnity is equal  to the difference between  the effective 
receipts and  the  level of  reference.  In some  cases  the ACP  may  be asked  to 
reconstitute  the  fund  from  which its compensation was  drawn.  The  rule is,that 
these  indemnities are to be  repaid,but it is softened in quite a  number  of ways. 
The  24  countries listed as  the  least developed are not  asked  to  repay  these 
"advances"  in any  circumstances.  For the  others  the rule operates  when  their 
export receipts in any year are above  the  level  of reference;  but  nothing 
will be  claimed from  them if the  increase is solely due  to an  increased volume 
of  exports  (as  opposed  to higher prices).  In all cases  the  repayment  will not 
exceed the amount  the ACP  country received by way  of  compensation,and no 
interest will be  payable for  the  period  between  the  receipt of it and its 
restitution,and in such circumstances this will  rank as an advance. 
Any  country which  has  received a  transfer may  not  be  asked  to  "reconstitute 
the  fund"  more  than five  years after it received it. At  the  end  of this 
period,if there has  not been "total reconstitution"  the  EEC/ACP  Council  of - 36-
Ministers will determine  what  is to happen  to  the credit. It may  decide it 
shall be  repaid  "wholiy or in part,in instalments or immediately",  or it may 
simply decide  to  abandon it. The  choice will be determined,inter alia,  by 
"the  position and  prospects for  the balance  of  payments  of the ACP  countries 
concerned,its reserves  of foreign  exchange  and its external indebtedness. 
III.  INDEX  NUMBERS  :  THE  INFERNAL  l•IA.CHINE  ? 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••am~•••••••• 
Adjustment  by index numbers  is a  perfectionist technique.  It can be 
grafted into commodity agreements,or into systems for stabilising export 
receipts.  The  fact that it is perfectionist does  not  mean  that its importance 
is secondary.  This is far from  being the  case.  Indeed  "indexation" adds a  new 
dimension to arrangements  instituted for market  control and  is concerned with 
one  of the key  elements -- the  level of prices -- concerned in these arrangements. 
Adjustment  to an index is a  guarantee  of  purchasing power  for developing countries 
and  might  even be  an assurance for their progress.  It would  consist of their 
being given an increase in the  prices of the  raw materials  they export exactly 
proportionate to,or even bigger than,the increase in the  prices of the goods 
they import.  They would  thus  be  avoiding a  deterioration in the  terms  of trade, 
especially as affecting the  poorer countries.  It is the  technique  of index 
number  adjustment which gives rise to  the keenest  controversy.  Most  developed 
countries regard it as a  sort of infernal machine  which would fan the fires  of 
an inflation and  bring the whole  world  economic  system to the brink of disaster. 
Most  developing countries regard it as  the  only definite and  effective way  of 
avoiding a  transfer of incomes  from  the  poorer countries  to  the richer. 
The  guarantee for the  purchasing capacity of developing countries,or even· 
its increase,can be  secured in one  of  two  waysT- either by market  operations 
to  impose  a  fixed price  (direct indexation)  or by  transferring funds  to  the 
developing countries  (indirect indexation). 
Preference for indirect indexation ? 
"In practice",according to an UNCTA.ll  report issued in July 1975  ~system 
of  ~:i.!:§~:L;i.n9.§di;~!~Q!l can  only' be applied to any basic  product if there are ways 
of fixing  the market  price fpr it at the desired level -- i.e. if it is possible 
to  operate effectively on  the market  prices".  This action of course is  aimed 
to bring the rise in prices for  raw  material into line with the rise in the 
prices of the goods  which  developing countries import.  It means  that direct 
indexation is only possible if you are in a  position to  control the  supply of 
the  products in question.  For this purpose  there are  only two  possible solutions. 
One  is the  making  of commodity  agreements  in which a  price fork is laid down 
and strictly respected,but subject to  index number  adjustments  depending  on  the 
prices of imports into developing countries.  The  second  is  ·;:,  .,  setting up  cartels 
which is practically out  of  the  question for developing countries with  the 
solitary  exc~ption of the oil producers. 
lB~ir~£~_iB~~~~~iQn,on the  other hand,  does not depend  on market  manip-
ulation. It is the  simpler business of  "making financial transfers corresponding 
to the movement  in market  prices for specific products  by  comparison with the 
reference level reduced  to an  index".  This  technique  could very well be  coupled 
with a  system for stabilising export receipts.  It is worth  looking at the  two - 37-
forms  of indexation to see what  are their respective advantages and 
inconveniences.  Both'of  them in practice have  the same  inconvenience  that 
they may  lead  to an_excess  of market  supplies.Producers in the Third World, 
knowing  that  their prices are guaranteed,will  tend  to  produce as much  as 
possible,and some  of the less efficient might  even be  tempted  to start up 
new  production.  This  inconvenience  can be  mitigated,for example,  by limiting 
the  price to a  cer;tain physical  volume., of production.  Both the  techniques 
raise difficult statistical problems,especially in selecting the  indices 
which are really representative of  prices. Apart  from  this indirect indexation 
seems  to have  more  points in its favour  than the  other. 
The  experts make  three important criticisms of the direct method.  In 
the first instance there is a  risk of  feeding the inflation in the  developed 
countries;  and as  a  counterpart to the rise in the  prices  of manufactures 
exported which results naturally from  the  inflation,there is the  counterpart 
danger of forcing·further rises  in raw  material prices.  In other words,  the 
direct indexation of  raw  material prices would  foster the viscious circle 
of inflation.  Secondly,  direct indexation might  lead  to serious market  dis-
turbances  (quite apart from  cases of over-production)  by  unduly high prices 
discouraging the  demand  for  the  product.  Direct indexation would  require 
stockpiling and  the cost would  soon be  prohibitive. Thirdly,the guaranteed 
price rises would  be of indiscriminate benefit both to  producers  in developing 
countries §nd  those in developed countries. 
If we  consider only the  product of concern  to developing countries,the 
field of application for direct indexation becomes  materially smaller.  The 
criticisms in question cannot be  laid at the  door of indirect indexation 
which appears as a  system of more  general and also more  differential scope 
however  paradoxical this may  sound.  It is more  general because it can be 
applied indiscriminately in all markets and  not  only to those which lend 
themselves  to commodity  agreements  (i.e. buffer stocks  and substitution 
problems).  It is more  differential because  the amount  of the financial 
t~ansfers can be adjusted by  reference  to the wealth or poverty of the  raw 
material producing countries.  This does  not  mean,however,  tr~t direct 
indexation must  be  put  entirely out  of court. It means  only,  that its field 
of possible application is smaller. - 38-
IV.  THE  UNCTAD  "INTEGRATED  PROGRAi'lffi'lE"  :  A BUNDLE  OF  CONMODITY  AGREEMENTS  ==================================================================== 
Since  UNCTAD  was  set up  in 1964,its secretariat has been consistently 
pleadi~ for a  thorough overhaul  of international trade  to  give it a  new 
balance  to  the  advantage  of developing countries.  This was,to a  large extent, 
the  purpose for which it was  formed.  Just at the  time when  the international 
community  was  concerning itself with the approach to this very problem,the 
secretariat thought fit to  put  forward  broad-based proposals  on  the  raw 
materials  problem. 
It was  early in 1975  that it published the  outline of its "integrated 
programme",  an ambitious  document  if ever there was  one.  It proposes  a  number 
of arrangements for stabilising the markets for 18  raw  materials regarded as 
essential products for developing countries in the first place,  but also for 
the developed ones.  The  list is not  fixed and final,but  can be  extended  or 
shortened if required.  For UNCTA.Dr.  the  important  thing is,that there should 
be a  definite commitment  to  operate the  programme,introducing it gradually 
if necessary.  ~n~-~~Qg~~mm~-~§_§y~~Q~!§~-~-!h~-~§Y§!Q~!gg_QQYB!r!~§-~B~ 
~!§!ik~~-hl-!h~-~~Y§!Q~~g_Qg~§~-~n~-~~-QQQ~§!Qn_fQr_!!§_gi§QY§§lQn_i§_YliQ~4Q_IY 
!h!gh_~§-12-E§_h~!g_~!-H~!rQE!_!n_~~-1~12~ Its destiny  wil~ depend  on  these 
discussions. It is the great brain-child of  the  UNCTAD  secretariat and it 
depends  fundamentally on setting up  international buffer stocks for  the  chief 
raw  materials. This is the  central plan;  and  around it are four other proposals: 
- joint financing of the  stocks  ; 
- multilateral undertakings  to buy and  to sell  ; 
- adoption  of machinery for stabilising export  receipts; 
- commercial  measures  to  e-ncourage  local processing of the  raw materials. 
What  it comes  to is that UNCTAD  is seeking a  whole  bundle of commodity 
agreements.When  such agreements are not  possible for whatever. technical  or 
political reason,  measures  wil~ have  to be  taken to stabilise  the export 
receipts of  the  developing countries.  Moreover,  the Geneva:.  experts have  an 
eye  to the future  in claiming commercial  measures  to  promote  local processing. 
In other words,they want  to  extend  the  scope  of the measures already adopted 
(on their initiative) by all developed  countries to promote  the export of 
manufactured  goods  from  developing countries.  These  measures are embodied  in 
various  systems  of generalised preferences,by which  the  developed countries 
give preferential tariff treatment  (waiver or reduction of duty)  to  the 
poorer countries.  The  importance  of these measures  should not be  under-
estimated.  In the 1975  report  of  the World  Bank,  it was  noted  that "liberalised 
imports  of basic  products,important as it may  appear on  paper,  would  probably 
be  only of .limited value  to the developing world  on  the  long-term.  The  outlets 
for products  in this class can only expand  slowly,becuse in most  cases  the 
income-elasticity is low.  The  long-term improvement  in export  prospects will 
accordingly depend  primarily on  the  trade in manufactured goods". 
On  the  short-term,nevertheless, it would  be  unprofitable  to overlook 
the  importance  of stabilising raw material markets. - 39-
18 commodities  in guest of agreements 
We  must  therefore examine  the list of  18 commodities  with which UNCTAD. 
would  like to begin.  In all cases both developing and  developed countries are 
concerned,either as importers  or exporters.  They fall into four  groups  : 
- ~~~~-~~~~~~~~ :  wheat,maize,rice,sugar 
essential industrial minerals  copper,lead,zinc,tin,bauxite,alumina and  iron-
ore  ; 
~~!-~~!~~~!~-~!-~~~~~~!!~~~!_£~=~=~ 
- ~~E~~~!-~=!!E~!=~ : tea,cocoa,coffee. 
cotton,jute,wool,hard fibres and  rubber 
The  18 products have in fact  been  extended  to  l9,by the  inclusion of oil-
seeds and  oil-bearing fruit,nuts and plants.  According  to  the  UNCTAD  calculations, 
the developing  ~roup of countries was  a  net exporter in the 1970-72  period,with 
an average annual surplus of exports amounting to $10  800 million. This  compares 
with an average deficit in the developed  countries 'of  $11  900  million,and in the 
socialist countries of $2 300 million.  If,on the  other hand,the four food  products 
and  the  oil-bearing materials are moved  from  the list,the developing countries 
still have an export surplus;  but if we  take wheat  and rice by  themselves,  the 
developing countries are shown  as a  net importer to  the extent of an average  of 
$2  100 million annually. 
These  figures  of course are rather out  of date.  The  view of the UNCTAD 
secretariat is,that the price boom  of 1973-74 must  have  resulted in a  deficit 
for developing countries whichare exporters of these  18 commodities,principally 
because  of the rise in imports  of food  products.  In this connexion it is to be 
noted that the  integrated ·programme  would  lose its significance altogether if 
the developing  countries,while their position as exporters was  growing stronger, 
should suffer a  deterioration through their position as  importers. Attention 
should be  paid to the share  of  the various groups of countries in the  trade in 
the  raw  materials of  the  UNCTAD  list (see  table  p.  40).  It will be  seen that 
for a  number  of these  products  the exports  from  the  developing countries are 
bigger than those  from  the  developed countries.  In this class are,sugar,coffee, 
tea,natural rubber,cotton,jute,hard fibres,copper and  tin. For a  number  of 
others,even  though  the  developed countries export more  than  the developing  ones, 
the latter are nevertheless  net exporters.  This is the  case  for maize,bauxite 
and iron ore.  In two  other cases,wool and  zinc,the trade of the  developing 
countries is pretty well in balance. 
In wheat and rice,as mentioned above,  the developing  countries  import  more 
than they export.  The  authors  of the  UNCTAD  document,incidentally,are fully aware 
of the danger of basing an argument  on  groups  of countries for  the individual 
coU11tries  are far from  having the  same  trade structure.  In this connexion it is 
shown,that  out  of  100  developing countries and  territories,80 were  net exporters 
of the listed products. 
Among  these 80 net exporters,there were  60 for which  the total exports 
'J:  of  the  18 commodities  were  three  times as  big as  the imports.  here were  20 
countries which were  net  importers  of the  "integrated programme  commodities",but 
some  of them  had  been able  to offset this by exports of oil,or other raw  materials, 
(e.g.  phosphates).  After making all the  necessary adjustments it was  eventually 
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2  936 
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713 
1  004 
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179 
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2  359 
2  648 
36  101 
- 40-
TRADE  IN  Pli:INCIP.A1  STURE  .f'RODUCTS  (average  1970-72) 
(million US  dollars) 
Exports  from  (countries)  Imports  to  (countries) 
Industrial Socialist Developing  All  Industrial Socialist Developing 
3,256  514  143  4  287  l  429  l  075  l  783 
l  466  67  471  2  233  l  799  212  222 
517  265  440  l  215  162  90  963 
2  474  306  l  245  4  309  3  409  266  634 
654  223  2  015  2  956  l  910  497  549 
72  l  2  863  3  241  2  920  142  179 
- - 759  781  607  139  35 
74  56  583  771  472  64  235 
21  - 983  l  230  767  343  120 
568  419  l  682  2  859  l  467  821  571 
70  21  659  810  501  116  193 
37  - 142  196  170  13  13 
l  120  45  165  l  554  l  176  248  130 
l  854  253  2  487  4  744  4  109  338  297 
123  25  622  761  618  54  89 
347  37  128  570  469  61  40 
539  93  190  870  690  77  103 
l  440  3ll  608  2  567  2  041  320  206 
l  273  365  l  010  3  488  3  080  383  25 
15  905  3  001  17  195  39  441  27  796  5  259  6  387 
Source  "Impact  of the  integrated  progra=e  on  imports"  (UNCTAD  - June  1975) - 41-
Afghanistan,Lesotho,Somalia,Yemen,Botswana and Guinea-Bissau -- and:five others 
were  close  to  the margin -- Bangladesh,Upper  Volta,India,~ri Lanka  and Senegal. 
In a  reform of world  trade in raw  materials, it is difficult to provide specially 
for  the  position of individual countries;  but  the  UNCTAD  proposal is that  the 
integrated programme  should  include special measures  for the benefit of countries 
which could not enjoy the full advantage  of the arrangements  to be  made. 
These  arrangements,  as already noted,are based  on  five  proposed measures: 
1)  setting up  of international buffer stocks  : 
The  key idea in the  integrated programme  is the stabilisation of prices by  the 
formation of buffer stocks,at any rate for  those  commodities  which  lend  them-
selves to  such treatment.  This is considered to be  in the interest both of 
exporters and  of importers.  For  the exporters the stocks would  enable  them  to 
avoid having to sell on  a  falling market,which is liable to result in further 
price weaknesses;  they would facilitate better investment  programming and  a 
more  constructive utilisation of resources,since fluctuating prices make  it 
difficult to assess  the  long-term profitability of  production;  they should 
improve  the  position of primary commodities  in their competition with synthetic 
products;  and in stabilising the  prices,they would also be stabilising the 
export receipts.  From  the standpoint of the  importers  the  setting up  of  the 
stocks should make  it possible,whether on  the long-term or  the short,  to rely 
on  the possibility of finding supplies and  on  fair access  to natural resources 
if there  should be  a  shortage,  Moreover,  importers have  everything to gain from 
knowing  in advance  the prices at which  they can secure supplies. 
The  UNCTAD  proposal favours  "multi-product stocks" meaning,that the adminis-
tration of the different stocks should be handled by the  same  organisation. 
This  would  give greater coherence  to  the action taken in the many  individual 
markets.  The'stock  adminis~ered under international control would  be  helping to 
defend  price forks  laid down  for  each product.  The  fixing of the floor and 
ceiling prices would,of  course,  be  a  difficult and  thankless  task for  the stock 
management,for nobody  really knows  what  is a  "fair"  price for any product.  No 
magic  formula is suggested,and there is no  question of  "indexation".  It is 
proposed,nevertheless,  that various specific criteria should be borne in mind 
movements  in "real"  prices and  the rise or fall in production costs for example. 
Each year there would  be a  price review  to correct any errors which might  have 
been made  hitherto,and which would  inevitably have their impact  on  the level of 
stocks. 
It is by no  means  certain that international buffer stocks would  be  a  sufficient 
instrument for lasting price stabilisation.  Other instruments might  also be 
considered,including export quotas,at any rate when it is proving difficult 
to hold prices above  the  predetermined floor.  If the  long-term price trend is 
consistently downwards,consideration could  be  given to export  taxes when  times 
are good.  In this way  part of the export  incomes  would  be  mopped  up,thus 
reducing the  stimulus to  over-investment which  inevitably occurs in t.i:QleSJ.of 
runaway  prices.  The  product of  such a  tax would  be  paid into a  joint fund  which 
might serve for financing diversification schemes when  any individual production 
seemed  likely to go  into decline. - 42-
2)  Formation of a  joint finance  fund 
The  main  obstacle  to setting up  international buffer stocks is 
·obviously a  question of finding finance  for  them.  Up  to now  na,·.co~tr~:.has 
given any undertaking,which makes  it extremely difficult to  devise any 
financing machinery.  According to the  UNCTAD  document,a  joint fund  to finance 
multi-product stocks works  out  less costly than the financing of stocks for 
each individual product.  This is on  the supposition that operations in 
different markets will tend  to offset one  another,with the  stock machinery 
buying one  product and  selling another. 
Noreover,  stock-management  usually earns profits,depending on  the  price 
movement  (the more  the fluctuation the greater the  possible profit)  their 
price-cycle  (the shorter the  cycle  the smaller the volume  of stock needed), 
storage costs and  other factors.  'l'here  must  of  course  be  substantial working 
capital from  the  outset,but it is difficult to determine  orders  of magnitude, 
because a  number  of items  have  to be  taken into account -- the number  of 
products,for example,  the  level of price guarantees,the gap between floor 
and ceiling prices and  the  level of stocks. According  to UNCTAD,the  setting 
up  of international buffer stocks for the 18 products listed in the  integrated 
programme,would  require about $10  700 million.  This is based  on  stocks  of 
between 6  weeks  and  3  months  of world  trade bought  in at the average  prices 
of 1970-74.  Of  this,  $  4  700 million would  be  for cereals  (wheat,maize and 
rice)  and another $4  700 million would  be  wanted  for sugar (1.2)coffee(l.O), 
jute (O.l),hard fibres  (0.03),  rubber  (0.2),  copper  (0.85)  and  tin (0.2)  and 
the  remaining $1  300  million would  cover wool  (0.5),lead  (O.l),zinc  (0.270), 
bauxite and alumina  (0.130)  and iron ore  (0.290). 
This figure,of course,  is no  more  than an indication. It may  seem  on  the high 
side;  but if we  calculate the  cost of  purchase at 1972-74  prices,  the bill 
works  out at $13  100 million.  'l'he  UNCTAD  proposal is for a  progressive 
approach,coricentrating on  different  products in turn,instead of setting up 
the whole  of the  stocks for  the whole  of  the list at the outset.  The  proposal 
is,that priority should be  given in the first phase  to  10  products -- sugar, 
coffee,cocoa,tea,cotton,jute and  hard  fibres,rubber,copper and  tin. The. 
pragmatic approach  can be  pushed  a  stage further by  noting that  three  of  these 
commodities  \coffee,cocoa and.tin)  are already subject to international 
a~reements,so that action could be  concentrated primarily on  the others.  It 
should also  be  remembered  that the list of  products itself is only an in-
dication.  Nany  other products might  become  candidates for international 
a~reements -- such as  the  oil-bearing materials.  Other commodities,too, 
might  be  withdrawn from  the  integrated programme. 
In a  note  issued in September 1975,  UNCTAD  gave  up  the  idea of setting up 
buffer stocks for iron ore.  The  market  prices for this product  are not 
really representative,  because most  of the mines  rank as  "captive~' meaning, 
that  they belong to  companies  or State organisations,which take  their product 
for their own  blast furnaces.  However  this may  be,  and.whatever be  the basic 
finance  requirement,the  problem  remains  of  where _and  how  the money  is to  be 
raised.  This is a  field in which  nothing is impossible.  There  might,for 
example,  be an increased contribution from  the  developed  countries,  or con-
tributions  could be  based  on  shares in the export  trade;  or of course,  the  funds 
might  be  borrowed. - 43-
3)  Stabilisation of export  receipts 
The  commodity agreement  system is not  necessarily applicable to every market. 
Machinery  must  therefore  be  thought  out,so as not  to penalise developing 
countries  the  products  of which  come  into other categories.  It might  happen, 
for example,that  some  specific product was  unsuitable for storage;  that it 
was  subject to keen competition from  synthetic  products;  or that 
stabilising prices tn the market  had  to be set aside because of the 
high cost.  In such cases,according to UNCTAD,the  machinery of stabilising 
export receipts could be  a  useful alternative.  The  same  machinery might 
indeed be  added  to  the guarantee available in any case  to  the exporter through 
the existence of a  commodity  agreement. 
There are many  possible ways  of stabilising export receipts for developing 
countries;and without  such stabilisation,they cannot  programme  their investments 
to the best advantage and  must  run the risk of getting into chronic diff-
iculties with their trade balances.  A calculation made  by the  UNCTAD  sec-
retariat shows,that the average annual  cost between 1964  and  1973  of the 
various stabilisation formulae  put  forward  by the experts or by some  of  the 
international organisations,would have varied between $1  000  million and 
$23  000  million.  ~his is,accordingly, another field in which  the  scope  for 
negotiation between the rich and  the  poor countries stretches over a  con-
siderable area.  The  number  of  technical variables  includes  the  products  to 
be covered,the number  of participants,the duration of the  scheme  and  the 
way  it is to be financed.  The  UNCTAD  view is,that instead of setting up 
entirely new  machinery,the best course would  be  to use  the existing  I~& 
machinery described above,and  subject to various adjustments  to make  it more 
flexible. 
4)  Multilateral sale and  purchase  commitments 
One  of the instability factors  in markets,lies in the uncertainty about  the 
demand.  This often leads  producers into over-investment  or under-investment. 
To  counteract so  fundamental  a  difficulty a  method  which has  long been in use 
is for suppliers and  their customers  to enter into contractual arrangements. 
The  suppliers in such cases  undertake  to deliver a  specific quantity of  the 
product concerned,while  the  customers  agree  to  buy  the  same  quantity.  The 
eastern countries have  used contracts of this kind  more  freely than most. 
The  arrangements  usually extend over several years,and include  price clauses. 
The  arrangementss~bilateral and  are made  not  only by governments,but  by 
the big corporations of the West.  Sometimes  the contracts are not  entrely 
bilateral,but operate between groups  of countries in the  same  way  as the 
sugar supply agreement  in the  Lome  Convention.  The  arrangement,however,  is 
far from  being general,and in any case  the contracts  (especially in their 
price clauses)  are by  no  means  uniform.  It is part of the  UNCTAD  thesis,that 
primary importance attaches  to generalising these sale and  purchase under-
takings at the world  level,applying them  to as many  commodities as  possible. 
This would facilitate the stabilisation of raw  material prices,especially 
since it would  be  possible to increase  the supply guarantee desired by 
importers.  The  Geneva  experts,incidentally,do not  claim to replace the "free 
play of market forces"  by' any world  programming  of  trade.  The  aim of  the 
commercial undertakings is simply to introduce a  "certain element  of planning" 
as is already done  "to quite a  large extent by  governments  and  private 
companies  operating on  a  scale large enough  to influence markets".  There is -«-
no  risk of trade being frozen into unchangeable  patterns,as might  be  feared 
from  the nature  of the arrangement.  The  commitments  would  be  contractual 
between all the exporters and all the  importers  of any given product,and  the 
volume  of sales and  purchases  would  not  be  fixed  on  a  country-by-country basis. 
The  advantage  of having  mu~tilateral instead of bilateral commitments  would 
lie in the  introduction of more  uniformity  (especially in the  prices)  in the 
different  ~rkets. 
5)  Commercial  measures  to encourage local  processing of  raw  materials. 
Many  developing countries  look to  the  local processing of their raw  material 
as a  method  of furthering their industrialisation.  In the  UNCTAD  view,this 
desire should not  be  frustrated.  Indeed it should be encouraged,for these 
countries will,on the  l~ng-term,  owe  their economic  health to  the  increase in 
the  proportion of manufactured goods  in their total exports -- the  proportion 
was  2o.%  in 1973  against  7%  in 1966.  UNCTAD  intends,therefore,  to give its 
integrated programme  a  dynamic  aspect which will not be  limited to laying down 
new  rules for  the  trade in raw  materials between developed  and  developing 
countries,but will also be  looking to  the future,when manufactured goods  begin 
to  predominate  in the exports  from  the  poorer countries.  Some  of  them,indeed, 
have already reached this point  (India,~outh Korea,Hong Kong,Taiwan,Jugoslavia); 
but  today everything indicates that the  developed countries,by putting limits 
on  the  traditional exports from  these countries  (especially textiles) are in 
some  measure  putting the brakes  on  their industrialisation.  ~he limitation 
results from  the  tariff and  non-tariff barriers put  by  the developed countries 
as  obstacles to their imports  from  the developing ones.  It is estimated that 
in the markets  of industrial countries,the developing countries have  to face 
customs duties  some  5o%  higher than those  charged  on  imports  from  other indus-
trial countries.  The  disparity is traceable  to  three  principal factors --
tariff cuts negotiated_in GATT  (Dillon Round  and Kennedy  Round),related  primarily 
to  trade between developed  countries.  Secondly,the  customs  duties charged by 
the developed  countries  increase  in line with the  degree  of manufacture,the 
rates being ~nimal for raw  materials and high for  finish~d goods.  Thirdly, 
various types  of goods are  charged specific duties,often by  reference  to 
physical characteristics,such as  packaging,weight  or number  of units,instead 
of being charged ad valorem.  The  effect of this  technique is to  protect manu-
facturers in the developed  countries. 
On  the other hand,  tariff obstacles are not  the  only ones.  In practice the 
developed  countries  put a  whole  series of non-tariff obstacles in the way  of 
trade from  the developing countries.  They  include,import quotas,licensing and 
unduly severe rules regarding  (for example)  health and  hygiene.  All these 
questions are at present  under  commercial  negotiation in GATT  (Tokyo  Round). 
At Nairobi,nevertheless,  the  UNCTAD  experts  would  like  to secure a  recognition 
in principle by  the developed countries of  the  need for  promoting imports  of 
manufactured  goods  from  the developing countries.  They  lay special emphasis 
on  the  importance  of  strengthening the various  systems  of generalised preferences 
currently in force. - 45-
PART  III - THE  BIG  GUNS  AND  THE  UNO  COf.1PROl\USE 
============================================== 
In the international discussions  on  raw  materials,and side-by-side 
with the United States and  the  "group of 77",the European Community  is one 
of the chief protagonists.  In many  international conferences  the  Nine  have 
been distinguished for their more  open attitudes to  the  ideas  put forward 
by the developing countries.  Admittedly  the  Nine,quite apart from  politics, 
have an important motive for dialogue with the Third World.  Apart from Japan 
the European Community  is more  dependent  than any other developed  country 
on raw  material supplies  f~om the  outside world  (see table below) 
Estimated  self~sufficiency of EEC  for certain 
raw  materials 
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±0  (N.B.  65%  with Nouvelle 
Caledonia) 
These  figures are mainly taken from  secondary sources 
and cannot therefore be regarded as a  first indication. 
The  year  of reference is usually 1972. 
Source  EEC  Commission 
The  two-fold  dependence  of the EEC 
The  European Commission,under the  chairmanship of  fil.  l!'rans:ois-Xavier 
Ortoli,  has  done all in its power  to convince  the member  governments  of the 
Community  of the  importance  of  taking action.  In February 1975,  in a.  communication 
to the Council of l'vlinisters  on  "Community  supplies of raw  ma terials
11  it gave 
a  summary  of international  problems  facing  the Nine,a.nd  the approach to  poss-
ible solutions.  The  communication was  limit~d to industrial raw  materials and 
gave  a  clear picture of the  Community's shortage of supplies. It brought  out 
the  two-fold dependence  of  the Nine  in regard to these supplies,first upon  the 
other developed  countries and also upon  the countries of the Third World.  The - 46-
supply problem in raw  materials,at any rate on  the economic  side, is not 
solely a  question of North and South.  ~he diagnosis is ruthless  :  "the  problem 
for Europe  is real and serious.  As  a  matter of history the continent became 
the  leading industrial power  in the world,primarily because it could  draw 
from its own  soi~ the coal,the iron ore,the copper ore,the  zinc ore it needed. 
When  it was  coming closer to exhaustion of its mineral resources, it was 
obliged to import  the  raw  materials required for its industry." Today it is 
"a region engaged in processing raw  materials  imported from  other continents, 
and re-selling them as finished goods".  "The  dangers for Europe  in its high 
degree  of  dependence  on  other  continents~the Commission  continues,"have  been 
consistently growing during the past few  decades". 
In a  reference to  the declaration on  the  "new  economic  order"  the 
Commission  takes  the view that this high  degree  of dependence  should encourage 
the Nine  to mould  a  future  in which  each nation shall be assured of a  fair 
place in the  economic  and social development  of the world.  The  Commission 
document  proceeds  to review  the  various  problems  facing the  Community  in 
regard to raw  materials.  The  survey ranges  from  the  problems  of method 
(insufficiency of knowledge)  to  the more  technical  problems  (risk of absolute 
or comparative  shortages)  and  including  : 
- ~~EE~l-~~~~==~-~~~~!!~=~=~~~l_!~~~=~ : 
"for most  raw  materials  the  rate of  the  Community's  dependence  on  imports 
from  outside countries varies between 70  and  100 %.  These figures,of  course, 
are trending upwards".  The  Commission  rules out any possibility of Europe 
adopting a  self-sufficiency policy,though there is much  to  be  gained in 
"ensuring the  rational use  of the limited resources which  Europe  possesses." 
It is important,nevertheless,  to seek a  greater variety in the sources of 
supply.This is a  spreading ofrisks,which includes  "a limitation of  the 
hold  on  various markets  exercised by  certain multinational corporations, 
especially foreign ones".  There  was  also the  possibility of arrangements 
to  "guarantee  private investments in developing countries and  promote 
their profitability",which would  lead to an "unfreezing of the flow  of 
private investment"  capable  of  inducing  "astonishingly positive  results~' 
both for underdeveloped  countries and  for Europe.  Looking at matters  from 
this angle,  a  useful departure might be  the  formation  of  "joint companies" 
consisting of private investors in the Community  and  public authorities in 
Third World  countries. 
the  tendency in this direction is increasingly widespread.  "It is thus 
becoming essential to conciliate the interests of producing and  consuming 
countries". As  a  method  of diminishing  the  risk of nationalisation,  systems 
of shared  ownership and  profit-sharing could be  envisaged.  This,however, 
does  not  solve  the whole  problem.  "Those  of the developing countries which 
possess both  raw  materials and under-employed  populations are understandably 
anxious  to  process their materials  on  the  spot".  "The  fears  engendered 
by this  tendenc~ among  industrialists in developed countries has  led them 
in the  past  to ask for measures  of trade  protection".  The  Commission  insists, 
that "this leads nowhere";  &nd  that what  is really wanted is "a more 
rational sharing of the world's industrial activity,more especially to the 
advantage  of  the developing countries".  The  Commission  goes  even further - 47-
than this,arguing that,  "Europe  must  agree  to  the gradual cessation of 
industrial activities which  could be done  better somewhere  else. Abandonment 
on  these lines is only relative,because it will be accompanied with european 
investments in outside countries".  Reasonable and well-reasoned steps must, 
therefore,  be  taken in this direction. 
to mitigate such risks,  a  number  of measures  "of a  conservative character" 
can be envisaged.  The  Commission mentions  :  long-term contracts,  safety 
stocks  (not  to be  confused with international buffer stocks)  and  the setting 
up  of international observation points. 
Four steps by  the  EEC 
In a  number  of cases  there  should be  no  hesitation about  making  inter-
national agreements,provided  the necessity for eliminating export risks is 
duly borne in mind. 
The  February communication is palpable evidence  of the  Commission's 
desire to seek negotiated solutions,  especially with the countries of the 
Third World.  This will never be  disproved,least of all in the Commission's 
further communication to the Nine  governments  in May  1975,on "raw material 
problema  and relations with developing countries which are exporters of raw 
materials".  In this the  Commission  envisaged four series of measures  : 
- trade cooperation  :  "these measures  should make  for  the elimination of 
tariffs-and-non:tariff barriers obstructing access  to the markets  of industrial 
countries of  raw  materials,with special reference  to the scaling down  of 
protection for  the value added  on  the first processing" •••  "equitable sol-
utions should be  found for the  problems of controlling export restrictions". 
- industrial cooperation :"it should be  one  of  the aims  of  the  Community  to 
promote-the-production and local processing of raw  materials,taking into 
account the  employment  problems both in the developing countries and in the 
industrial countries". Action suggested under this head  includes  :  the 
promotion of investment in developing countries;  increasing the sources  of 
investment;  protection of investments,guaranteed profit transfers;  the  encour-
agement  of joint companies;  avoidance  of bottlenecks arising through under-
investment;  encouragement  of long-term purchase  and  delivery contracts; 
promotion of  technology transfers. 
limitation of price fluctuations  :  In the  Commission's  view this is in the 
interest-both-of-producers-and-of consumers.  The  measures  will require 
examination on  a  product-by-product basis.  "In the first instance  the  exam-
ination must  relate to commodities mainly exported by the  developing countries 
and  the prices of which are subject to wide  fluctua  tiona".  In some  cases 
there shuuld be  stockpiling and de-stocking measures.  "The  functioning of 
some  of the world agreements  might  be  improved  by  the  consuming  countries 
taking a  share in financing  the  stocks".  'l'he  Commission  takes  a  rather 
doubtful line about  "indexation"  which"it  would  be  a  mistake  to  regard as a 
panacea,providing by rule of thumb  a  solution to every  problem". ~ 48-
- stabilisation of export receipts  :  the  Commission itself maintains  an  inter-
national-operation-for-this-purpose,and adds  that  "this should be additional 
to  the aid at present  provided for developing countries".  The  Commission  records 
the  existence  of  two  approaches  to stabilisation -- the  system which  covers  a 
wide  range  of  products,but  only for  the benefit  of  the  poorest  developing 
countries;  or a  system  to  benefit all developing countries,but applying only 
to a  limited range  of commodities. 
This  communication by  the  Corr@ission  was  in fact  the  raw  materials section of 
its proposals  to  the Nine,in readiness  for  the 7th extraordinary special 
Session of  the  UN  Assembly  in .::ieptember  1975.  Two  other documents  on  raw 
materials were  also  put  before  the Nine  in June  1975.  These  contain valuable 
information,primarily of a  technical character about  commodity  agreements and 
machinery for stabilising export receipts. 
The  various  communications  from  the  Commission  were  used as  a  basis for dis-
cussions between the Nine.  The  raw  materials question came  upon  the Community 
scene  through  the  main  entrance,at  the meeting  of  the  European  Council  in 
Dublin  (lliarch  10 and  11  1975).  It was  settled for  the  time  being through  the 
adoption by  the Nine  of a  joint attitude at  the  EEC  Council  of Ministers  on 
July 22  1975  in Brussels. 
There  was  nothing really new  for  the  Nine  in discussing the  raw  materials 
problem.  It is a  problem which  impinges alike  on  its agricultural,its commercial 
and its development  cooperation policies,and the  Community  has been concerned 
with it on  several occasions.  In the multilateral negotiations in GATT,the 
Community  countries  proposed  the negotiation of agreements  covering a  wide 
range  of agricultural produce  (wheat,maize,sorgho,barley,rice,sugar,powdered 
milk,butter and butyric fatty substances).  In addition,the Community  as  such 
is associated in various  ways  with a  number  of existing agreements,including 
those  on  coffee,cocoa,tin,sugar and wheat.  Still more,it  cooperated with  the 
46  ACP  countries in devising the"stabex"  system which figures  in the  Lome 
C0nvention.  It made  a  long-term contract with the  sugar producers  of the Third 
World,providing guaranteed outlets over the  long-term;  and,quite apart from 
the agriculture  policy,which is entirely within the  competence  of the  Community, 
it has  avatlable various  instruments relating to several classes of  products  ~­
e.g.  the  fixing of export  quotas  for  copper and  other non-ferrous  metals  or 
for scrap. 
The  New  York  compromise 
The  joint attitude made  ready by the  Nine  for  the  extraordinary UN 
Assembly  in  ~eptember 1975,covered the  whole  ground relating to  raw  materials 
and  development.  In  New  York,in  ~eptember 1  - 15,  the  representatives of  the 
Nine  played a  decisive  part in working  out  the  compromise  between the arguments 
of the Third World  and  those  of the developed  countries.  The  Nine,and more 
especially the  Commission,were  very active as mediators  between  the  United 
States and  the"group of  77".  Their joint declaration was  made  by the  Italian 
Foreign Affairs Minister,  Signore  Mariano  Rumor;  and  though  observers  were 
less impressed .by  this  than by  the flowing  discourse  of 0ecretary of 0tate 
Henry Kissinger,  the  part  played by  the  Community  in the  lobby was  of first 
class importance. After several days  intensive negotiation,punctuated  by 
threats of rupture,  a  resolution was  adopted  on  September 15  and  this sets up 
a  new  starting point.  Hithout  this,the prospects for holding a  dialogue between - 49-
the· Third World  and  the developed  countries would  have  suffered serious 
prejudice. It contained many  areas which are not completely clear,and which 
will have  to be  fully ventilated  in the  course  of  the UNCTAD  meeting in 
Nairobi,the Tokyo  rtound  discussions in GATT  and  the North-South dialogue 
in Paris;  but  the citadel is intact and  the bridges have not  been destroyed. 
The  resolution was  accepted by all the delegations  taking part in the Assembly, 
even though  some  of them  raised reservations on specific questions,such as 
the  target of bringing up  public aid to the equivalent of 0.7%  of the  GNP. 
At  the previous  extraordinary Assembly  in April 1974,  no  such tranquility 
prevailed,and the declaration on  the  "new  international economic  order"  had 
been adopted in a  background  of utter confusion.  The  resolution of September 15 
is concerned with  the general question of relations between developed countries 
and  developing countries;  and it does  this under five headings -- international 
trade;  transfer of real resources;  science and  technology~ndustrialisation; 
and  food  and agriculture. 
Reference  to  the section directly concerned with the  raw  materials 
problem,gives  us  a  certain insight into the future negotiations.  Moreover, 
we  can see  the  broad lines of the attitude to be  taken by  the  three chief 
parties.  The  Community's  view is set out in the document  approved  by the  EEC 
Council on July 22  1975;  the developing countries'  in a  memorandum  drafted 
by the  "group of 77",also in July 1975;  and  the United States in a  Kissinger 
speech in UNO  in September.  The  other delegations,including the eastern 
countries and Japan,  have  so far left the initiative with  these  three. 
I. The  trade in raw  materials 
Commodity  agreements  :  the resolution thinks  the 4th  ill~CTAD conference 
should-make-it-possible "to reach decisions about  improving  the structure 
of markets for raw  materials and basic  products,the export  of which is a 
matter of concern ·for developing countries,including decisions  on an 
· integrated programme  and the application of its component  elements.  The 
resolution suggests that having regard to the  special aspect of each of 
the basic products and  raw  materials,these decisions should relate to  : 
- "suitable international storage to ensure stable,remunerative and fair 
prices for basic  products,the export  of which is a  concern of developing 
countries,and to  promote a  state of balance between supply and demand. 
including,whenever possible,  multilateral commitments  on  the  long-term"; 
- "the setting Y,p  of suitable international finance  mechanisms  for the 
purpose  of  these arrangements  regarding stockpiling and markets"; 
- "the adoption,whenever possible,  of measures  calculated to encourage 
long-term and  medium-term contracts"  ; 
- "the setting up of improved  machinery for compensatory finance in 
respect of fluctuations  in export  receipts by broadening and streng-
thening the machinery already in existence"; 
"the adoption of measures  calculated to encourage  the  processing of  raw 
materials in the developing countries which  produce  them,and generally 
the expansion and diversification of their exports,especially those 
consigned to developed countries". -50-
"The  UNCTAD  secretariat general should  put  before  the fourth session 
of  the Conference a  report  on  the repercussions  of an integrated programme  on 
imports  into developing countries,whichare net importers of raw  materials 
and basic  products, including those  which are lacking in natural res.ources  and 
should  recommend  such corrective measures  as may  appear necessary". 
This  text gives partial satisfaction to the  "??",because it refers 
in terms to  the integrated programme  and gives a  statement  of its component 
elements.  The  satisfaction is only partial,because the developing  countries 
would  have  preferred to see  a  more  open  support  by the international community 
for the integrated  programme  put  forward  by the  UNCTAD  secretariat.  Instead 
the resolution mentions  only  "an"  integrated  programme ,and that some  of its 
"elements"  might  be  interesting.  Neither the  EEC  nor the United States was 
willing to give its endorsement  to  the  UNCTAD  project,which they were  only 
prepared to consider as asa working  paper.  For them  there was  no  question of 
launching into  the simultaneous negotiation of a  great number  of commodity 
agreements.  In each case studies must  be  made  of the solutions most  appropriate 
to  the  individual market -- or if you  prefer it that way,  you must  "take 
account  of the special aspects  of each basic  product or raw material".  The 
Community  nevertheless,  took a  more  positive  line about  commodity  agreements 
than did the United States.  It is willing to examine  possible ways  of coping 
with the  problems  of developing countries,especially in the light of particular 
cases,and in order to "avoid excessive fluctuations"  in prices.  For the United 
States,Mr.  Kissinger did not  conceal his dislike of price agreements which 
disturb the markets,check.production and  lead  to  a  waste  of resources.  "Price 
stabilisation is not in general a  promising approach",he  said.":::luch an objective 
can only be  secured~he continued,"through severe restrictions on  production 
or export,and the setting up  of extremely costly stockpiles inducing price 
rises whi9h might well lead to encouragements  to  the  production of substitutes". 
According  to  the United States,too,  the  price stabilisation which is being 
sought,  would  not  be  of automatic benefit to developing countries.  What  the 
United States would  like to see,would be  the setting up  of  producer-consumer 
discussion forums  for each individual product,even if this did not  exclude 
adhesion to some  of  the  commodity  agreements  (coffee,cocoa,tin).  To  mark  their 
reserve  about any unduly close control of markets,the United States embodied 
it in a  note to  UNO  on  the advisability of regulations. It is clearly indicated 
that  the Nairobi negotiations,which will settle the destiny of  the integrated 
programme  of UNCTAD,are  like~y to be very closely argued. 
Under  the food  and agriculture heading in the resolution,  there are 
several points relating more  specifically to  the  trade in raw  materials. 
The  resolution provides,that the developed countries should "effectively" 
facilitate access  to their markets for agricultural  produce and  food 
products,the  export  of which  is of concern to developing countries. 
Further "insofar as  concerns  improved  productivity for agricultural non-
food  products and forestry products,and their ability to withstand  the 
competition of  synthetic products, it would  be  desirable for research 
and  technological assistance  to  be coordinated and financed  by ~ppropriate 
machinery".  The  UNO  resolution recommends  the developed  countries,when -51-
they are liquidating their surpluses to be  careful  "not  to  induce un-
justified price fluctuations  and  not  to disturb  the  markets for export 
products  of concern to exporting developing countries".  It would  be 
desirable,too,  to  "set up  and maintain world stocks  of  food  cereals 
on  a  sufficiently large scale to  provide remedies  for the  big production 
deficits which can be foreseen". 
This extract from  the resolution is  o!).::speci~advantage to  the  "77
11 ,and 
much  less ambiguous  than the  preceding passage.  The  United States  consider  that 
the  problem of raw  materials is primarily  the  problem  of  food  products,which 
must  therefore be  taken as  a  priority matter.  They  proposed  the setting up  of 
world  stocks  (under national admin:j.stration)  of rice and  wheat,equivalent  to 
30 million tonnes.  By  way  of indication it may  be  noted  that the  FAO  estimates 
the safety level of cereal stocks  to  ensure  the world 1s  food  requirements at 
45  - 50  million tonnes, including the  secondary cereals. llloreover,  the American 
proposal was  mentioned in the  UNO  resolution.  The  stocks  proposed are not for 
any  permanent  regulation of  the market,but solely for dealing with shortage 
conditions.  The  United States propose,too,  that developing countries with storage 
difficulties should  be assisted.  The  Community  has  recognised  the special 
importance attaching to  "the  prouuction and  supply of food  products";  and  the 
Nine  have  already made  proposals  to  GATT  that  commodity  agreements  should be 
made  for a  number  of food  products. 
Stabilisation of export receipts  :  the  compensatory finance  machinery 
currently-available-through-the-I~~ should be  developed and  liberalised". 
The  I~&,also, should  thus  examine  at an early date  the  proposals aimed 
at liberalising its cover  of  current account  transactions and  extend it 
to manufactured goods  and  services;  to  take all possible  steps to  see 
that compensation for export deficits shall take  place at the  time  when 
they are actually happening;  to determine  the  level of compensation by 
reference  to movements  in the  prices of goods  imported;  and  to  extend 
the  period allowed for repayment.  The  greater flexibility envisaged for 
the  II~ machinery must  not  lead to other proposals being bypassed, 
especially that of  the United States for a  "new  security mechanism
11
• 
The  "77"  have  got  practically all they claimed.  The  Community  had decided 
to  take  part in an international movement  "to  improve  the  H:!l!'  compensatory 
finance  scheme,and set up  specific arrangements  for  the  benefit of the  poorest 
developing countries".  In the  UNO  resolution the  Community  thus  agrees  to  give 
details of some  of  the  improvements it had  contemplated.  It will be noted,in 
particular,  that it is  no~ opposed  to the financing being extended  to all the 
current account  receipts of  the developing countries,and not  confined  to  the 
exports  of manufactured goods.  It also agrees  that  the  amount  of  compensation 
shall be  determined  by  reference  to  the  movement  of  import  prices which is in fact 
a  form  of indexation.  '£he  United States have  the satisfaction of seeing that  the 
proposal they made  to  UNO  has  not  been exvressly rejected.  The  effect of it was  to 
drop  the  present  compensatory finance  system  of the  H'iF,  and  replace it with 
a  system covering all the export receipts and financed with a  float  of  $2  500 
million p.a.  {more  if possible),the total outstanding being allowed  to  run to 
$10  000 million.  All the developing countries  could have  the benefit of this new -52-
source of finance;  and  loans made  to  the  poorest  of them  could be  converted 
ta grants by  the  fiduciary fund  (see  page  22)  contemplated as an adjunct  to 
the  IMF. 
Indexation  :  the  resolution contains  two  references  to indexation)::he 
first-is-indirect,stating that production in developing countries should 
be  "improved"  and  their export receipts should be"increased in such a 
way  as  to  counter-balance  the adverse  effects of inflation,and thus 
maintaining the real income  of the developing countries,so as to  improve 
their terms  of trade and  eliminate  the economic  imbalance  between 
developed and  developing countries".  The  second is more  direct  :  "There 
are a  number  of solutions  open  to the  international community for 
preserving the  purchasing power  of the developing countries.  They  should, 
as a  matter of priority,  be  more  closely studied.  The  UNCTAD  Secretary 
General should  continue  the studies of direct and  indirect indexation 
plans and  other solutions,with a  view  to  putting forward definite 
proposals before  the fourth session of  the  Conference". 
The  wording  of 'the resolution is very cautious.  There is an agreement 
to study the  problem,but not  to accept  the  principle. This is not  surpr~s~ng. 
Neither the Kissinger speech nor the  joint document  of  the Nine  contains any 
reference to indexation,though the  principle is aggressively defended by  the 
"77".  '.L'he  developing countries would  in fact  like  the integra  ted  programme  to 
help in improving  (and not merely maintaining)  their terms  of trade.  They  hope 
to stave off the inflation exported by  the developing countries. 
trade in manufactured goods  :  "concerted efforts should be made  to 
speed-up-the-dev~lopment-and diversification of exports  from  developing 
countries of manufactured and  semi-finished goods,processed and  partly 
worked  products,so as  to  increase their share of the world's industrial 
production,and international trade in the framework  of an expanding 
world  economy".  The  resolution also suggests that  in the Tokyo  Round 
negotiations,effective arrangements  be  made  "to reduce  or eliminate 
non-tariff barriers  "  to their exports set up  by  the  developed countries 
"on a  differential basis,more favourable  to the developing countries". 
It would  also be  desirable to extend the  period during which  the general-
ised preferences apply,and  to  improve  the  system.  "Compensatory duties 
should  only be applied in conformity with known  international obligations. 
Developed countries should show  the greatest possible flexibility within 
the  framework  of their international obligations  when  it comes  to 
charging compensatory duties  to  imports from developing. countries". 
During  the Tokyo  Round  developing countries should be  given "differential 
and  more  favourable  treatment if this is justified by  the  circumstances". 
Restrictive commercial  practiees which  impede  international trade,and 
especially the  trade  of developing countries,  should  be  eliminated;  and 
efforts should be  made,both on the national and  on  the international 
level,to draw  up  a  code  of equitable rules and  principles". -53-
The  United States and  the Community  have  given their approval of 
principle to a  large part of the  claims made  by developing countries. There are, 
however,  many  precautions and approximations  marked  by  phrases  such as  "whenever 
j;his is feasible";  "on a  basis more  favourable  to developing countries";  "in 
conformity with international obligations";  "the greatest possible flexibility11 • 
The  fact  remains  that the  "77"  have not been successful in getting what  they 
so insistantly claimed --"preferential,non-discriminatory and non-reciprocal" 
concessions within the shortest possible time.  On  the  other side of the  picture, 
they have  not  recognised  two  principles to which both  the  United States and 
the Community  are very faithful  the international regulation of export res-
trictions and  guaranteed access  to  the  natural wealth of  the Third world. -54-
PART  IV  - INSTANCES  AND  ILLUSTRATIONS 
1.- An  important basic food  product  :  wheat 
2.- .Intensive  competition between North and  South  sugar 
3.- A monopoly  for developing countries  coffee 
4.~ A strategic raw  material  copper 
5.-·-Competitive  production from  developing countries  :  textiles 
6.- Competition between natural and  synthetic  rubber -55-
1. WHEAT  :  A CASE  OF  PRIORITY 
The  eastern countries are  the world's biggest wheat  producers,accounting 
for 150  million tonnes  in 1974  against 140  million tonnes  from  the dev-
eloped countries of the West  and  72  million tonnes  from  the developing 
countries.  This  predominance,however,  is quite relative,for the western 
developed countries have  practically a  monopoly  of  the world market  sales. 
In 1974-75  their exports amounted  to 63  million tonnes  out  of  .  total 
world exports  of 70  million tonnes.  'l'he  share of the other groups  of 
countries is thus practically non-existent. 
Two  western countries play the key role in world  exports -- the United 
States .(30  million tonnes)  and Canada  lll million tonnes).  The  Community 
is also a  considerable exporter \nearly 11.5 million tonnes annually since 
1973)  and  so is Australia  (8.4 million tonnes  in 1974-75).  All these 
countries have an important part to  play in the negotiation of a  wheat 
agreement.  The  chief importers are  the developing countries  (40  million 
tonnes)  especially the countries of the Far East.  Other importers  include 
the eastern countries  (12.3 million tonnes).  The  western developed countries 
are also importers of substantial quantities  (17.7 million tonnes). 
The  world  market for wheat  has  for  some  years been very irregular.  It 
has  never yet been  possible to reconstitute the sharp fall in stocks in 
the exporting countries  (EEC,Canada,USA,Argentina,Australia) at the  end  of 
their 1972-73  crop.  The  total of nearly 50  million tonnes  in 1971-72 
amounted  to  scarcely 23  million tonnes in 1974-75.  Against  this background 
the supply of wheat  to a  number  of  importing countries depends very largely 
on  the  production in the year of supply;  and  this is subject to many 
hazards,such as drought  and  crop maladies.  At  the slightest threat of 
comparative shortage prices naturally soar. 
For the developing countries,whose financial resources are negligible, 
this instability is very damaging.  The  inconveniences  of  the price boom 
can be  diminished to  some  extent by  the food  aid  programmes  sponsored by 
the big exporting countries;  but  even so,  the world  wheat  market is one 
of  those  in which  international action is specially urgent. 
2.  SUGAR  :  BEET  AND  CANE., 
The  world market  for sugar is dominated  by  the  cane  producers.  In 1975, 
out of the world  production of nearly 80  million tonnes  of sugar,  30 
million came  from  the  beet producers and  the other 50  million from  cane. 
The  same  distribution is really applicable to  the  shares of developed 
and  developing countries.  In 1975  the  developing countries  produced  40 
million tonnes,the western industrial countries  22  million tonnes and 
the eastern countries  17  million tonnes.  The  EEC,with a  production of 
9 million tonnes,  ranks among  the world's biggest  producers,with the  USSR 
(8.3 million tonnes)  and  Cuba  (5.2 million tonnes). -56-
The  bulk of the world's  exports comes  from  the developing countries 
accounting for  16  million tonnes out of a  1974  total of 23  million tonnes. 
Some  of  them  (the sugar producers among  the ACP)  have  a  sales guarantee 
from  the Community  and Cuba  has  one  from  the  USSR~ Up  to  the  end  of 1974, 
too,the United States had a  supply contract with a  number  of  producers, 
but this agreement was  not  renewed.  The  main  part of  the international 
trade in sugar,therefore,  passes· through  the  open market;  and  in l974,with 
stocks abnormally low,the fear of a  shortage led to soaring prices.  The 
quotations  rose six-fold  duri~g the year,  a  very exceptional occurrence 
which was  maintained by speculation.  The  sugar producers  of the Third World 
were  among  the  biggest beneficiaries in the whole  boom  in raw  material 
prices in 1973-74.  Their position in the world market  is,nevertheless, 
rather precarious,for the developed countries,including the  EEC,  are in a 
position to raise their output substantially. 
3.  COFFEE  :  HOW  TO  SELL  AT  A HIGHER  PRICE 
Coffee is a  typical  example  of a  Third World  monopoly.  All the  producers 
are developing countries,led by Brazil and  Colombia.  The  latin-american 
producers are  responsible for nearly half the  world  production  (2.12 million 
tonnes in 1975  out of a  world total of 4.78 million tonnes).  Next  in order 
comes  the african continent with a  total of 1.27 million tonnes. 
Coffee exports  go  primarily to  the industrial countries of  the West, 
with~ 2.9 million tonnes  in 1974  out  of a  world total of 3.2 million tonnes. 
The  chief importers are  the  EEC  (1.15 million tonnes and  the United States 
(1.07 million tonnes).  Producers'  efforts to coordinate  the  marketing of 
coffee to their own  best advantage have  had  only a  limited success.  Producers 
do  not seem  able  to enforce  their price. 
4.  COPPER  :  A TEST  FOR  NORTH-SOUTH  COOPERATION 
The  world  market  for copper fluctuates wildly.  With an extra push 
from  speculation, the  price went  very high in the  1973-74  boom.  'J:hough 
copper can be  replaced in some  of its uses  by  other non-ferrous metals, 
it nevertheless  ranks  undeniably as  a  strategic supply.  In  ~eptember 1975 
Mr.  Kissinger expressly mentivns  the case  of copper in his speech to UNO. 
Horld exports  come  in almost  equal shares from  developed  and  developing 
countries;  and it is important  that there should be  close  cooperation 
between  them.  This  is also the desire  of  Zafre,Zambia,Chile and  Peru,which 
set up  the  inter-governmental copper  producers'  Council in 1967.  They  are 
not  themselves  in a  position to get control of  the world market,and hope 
they will be  able  to  cooperate with the  developed  countries.  This co-
operation might  well  lead  to market  stabilisation,though the developed 
countries are hesitant about  the  costs  potentially involved in setting up 
a  buffer stock.  All four  of the  CIPEC  countries have  nationalised most  of 
their mines  and  processing plant and  the wider  cooperation might  also 
extend  into the  investment  field. -57-
Production and  consumption  The  world  output  of refined copper in 1973 
was  8.5 million tonnes.  The  chief producers  included  the  United States  (2.1 
million tonnes,  or  24.3%  of  the world  total.  Next  came  USSR  (1.3m),  the  EEC 
(l.Om),Japan  (0.95m),while  Canada,Chile and  Zambia  produced  rather less than 
half a  million tonnes  each.  The  CIPEC  countries  (Chile,Peru,Za!re and  Zambia) 
accounted for only 15.1% of the world  output of refined,though this represented 
28.6%  of  the world  production of  ore,and 25.4%  of the  output of raw  copper. 
The  world consumption of refined copper is dominated by  the EEC,the  United 
States,USSR and Japan.  These  four countries  together account  for more  than 
three quarters  of world  consumption in l973,whereas  the CIPEC  countries 
consumed  only half of  1%.  '.i'he  EEC  consumes  much  more  than it produces, with a 
supply deficit of about  a  million tonnes.  The  Nine  EEC  countries have  pract-
ically no  copper ore,which is found  mainly in the United 3tates  (1.6 million 
tonnes  extracted in 1973,U3SR  (l.lm),Canada  (0.815m),Chile  0.735m),Zambia 
(0.707m),Za!re  (0.490m),Peru and  the Philippines about  220,000  tonnes  each 
and Papua-New  Guinea slightly less.  The  E~C depends  on  importing copper ores 
and  raw  copper,and.on its substantial recoveries from  scrap to  produce  refined 
copper,of which its 1973  output was  900  000  tonnes. 
Trade  :  Developing countries account for  55%  of world exports,against about 
4Q1b  for western industrial countries and  5%  for the  eastern countries.  Nearly 
9o%  of  the  imports are into industrial countries.  The  world's chief copper 
exporters are  Zambia  (average  of $760 million in 1970-72),Chile  (700m),Canada 
(550m),Zafre  ($450m),Belgium  (400m),the United States  ($260m),Peru  ($260m), 
the Philippines  ($190m)  and  USSR  (~180m).  The  chief importers·are Japan 
($860m),Germany  ($720m),Great Britain ($520m),France  ($410m),Belgium  ($410m), 
the  United States  ($390m)  and  Italy  ($360m). 
In 1973  the  EEC  spent $235  million for its supply of  copper ores,which  came 
primarily from  the developed countries  (Australia,Canada and South Africa). 
To  this must  be  added  no  less  than $3  500  million for the  imports  of  copper 
in metallic form.  The  chief suppliers included  Zaire  ($630m),  Zambia  ($497ml 
and  Chile  ($408m).  Belgium,which has a  big copper refining and  processing  · 
industry exported $423  million to its EEC  partners. 
Prices  :  Copper  prices did not  escape  the  1973-74 boom.  In the London  Metal 
Exchange  the quotation for electrolytic bars  rose from £412.4  in June  1972 
to a  peak of £1  267.7  per  tonne  in April 1974.  Since  then prices have  been 
falling back,but  they have  not  passed  the  1972  low. 
5.  TEXTILES  :  WHEN  THE  POORER  COUNTRIES  ARB  CO~WETITORS 
The  world  markets for·cotton and wool,which are the  two  principal 
natural textile fibres,provide us  with indications of the  problems  which 
may  arise in the cooperation between developing and developed countries.  This 
is for three reasons.  In the first instance the  two  fibres  compete  with  one 
another,at any rate over part of the ground;  and whereas  cotton is largely 
a  Third World  product,the wool  market is dominated  by the developed countries. 
Secondly,both the cotton and  the wool  markets are under  the  threat of synthetic 
products.  And  finally,the developing countries have  successfully taken to 
themselves  the  local processing of a  great deal of their own  cotton. -~-
cotton.  The  four big cotton producers are USSR  (2.8 million tonnes  in  1974)~ 
the-United States  (2.5m),China  (2.lm)  and  India  (1.2m).  These  £our countries 
produce nearly two  thirds of the total world  crop of 13.6 million tonnes,of 
which  42.3% is grown  in developing  countries,20.Clf~ in western industrial 
countries and  36.&~ in eastern countries.  Production therefore is not 
dominated  by any  of  the  three groups,but  the.developing countries account 
for only a  little less  than two-thirds  of world  exports.  For many  developing 
countries,indeed,  the exports of raw  cotton are an important  source of income. 
For Sudan  they represent about  6~of the export receipts,  for Egypt  45%  and 
Syria  40.1~,while  the  corresponding figure is also high for  ~urkey and 
Nicaragua  (24%  each)  Uganda  (2~~),Angola (15%),Tanzania  (14%),Salvador, 
Pakistan and  Guatemala  l~fo each.  Projects for  reforming  the  world  trade in 
cotton are largely concerned  with better international planting programmes 
and  the setting up  of an international stockpile. 
wool  is produced  mainly in developed countries.  In 1974,with a  total world 
output  of 2.6 million tonnes,Australia contributed 770  000  tonnes,  USSR 
460  000  tonnes,New  Zealand  300  000  tonnes,  South Africa 110  000  tonnes,the 
United States 70  000  tonnes.  Among  the developing countries,the only  im-
portant contributions were 180.000 tonnes  from Argentina and  63  000  tonnes 
from Uruguay.  This  predominance  of  the developed countries is repeated  in 
the world  trade figures.  The  western industrial countries  contributed nearly 
9Qf~ of world exports,Uruguay being the  only developing country  to earn a 
material  portion  (20%)  of its export receipts from  wool.  As  for cotton, 
the world  market stabilisation projects call for better production-planning 
and  the building-up of stocks. 
Both for wool  and for cotton the  steps  envisaged for bringing world  markets 
under control run up against a  great number  of difficulties.  To  begin with, 
the competition between. the  two  fibres means  that  nei~her must  be appreciably 
better treated  than the  other.  In practice,however,  the  chief competition 
is not  between  the  two  fibres,but between  them  and  the  chemical fibres. 
This  puts a  very special responsibility on  the  shoulders of the industrial 
countries  \both western and  eastern)  in the administration of any agreement 
which may  be  made  about  cotton and wool,because  they are overwhelmingly 
the biggest  producers,both of synthetic  (petrochemical)  fibres and artificial 
(cellulosic) fibres.  Competition has  been running consistently in favour 
of the  chemical fibres,especially since  the sixties. As  recently as  the 
1964-66  period,the world  consumption of natural fibres  (cotton,wool,linen 
and silk)  was  running at an average of  70Vo  of  the total,but in 1974 it was 
only  5Cf~.  European  textile experts are convinced that this trend still has 
some  years  to run.  Some  of the developing countries,indeed,are hitting back 
by making  their own  chemical fibres;  but so far only half a·dozen countries 
have  taken this  step,Mexico,Bra~il,India,South Korea,Taiwan and Hong  Kong). 
For natural fibre  produce~s,therefore,  there is a  risk that the  position 
may  grow  worse,even if the rise in oil prices should momentarily chill the 
enthusiasm of the  chemical fibre  producers. 
Last of all,there may  be yet one  more  bone  of contention between the  dev-
eloped countries and  the developing ones.  The  poorer countries,at any rate 
some  of  them,  have successfully set up  textile industries of their own,and 
these are well able to withstand  the  competition of the developed countries. -59-
The  latter have  sought  to protect themselves,and  to  this end  have  set up 
all manner  of obstacles against exported cotton goods  from  the developing 
countries.  Customs  duties charged by the wealthier countries on imported 
yarns and fabrics are among  the highest in their tariffs;  and  these  imports, 
too,  are in many  cases kept  out  by  the  quota system.  Moreover,  the curious 
systems of generalised preferences are extremely restrictive when  it comes 
to textiles.  There  can be no  doubt whatever about the restrictive effect 
these obstacles are having  on  the industrialisation of  the  Third World 
which,nevertheless,  accounts for an estimated  proportion of nearly  2~fo in 
the world  trade in textiles and  clothing.  A country such as India,for 
example,though it is a  big cotton producer,still has  to  import cotton to 
feed its spinners and  manufacturers.  The  trade in cotton and,to a  somewhat 
lesser extent in wool,is not only a  raw  material  problem.  It brings us  face 
to face  with  the  question of industrialisation in the Third World  and  the 
ability of developing countries to  process  their own  raw  materials.  The 
GATT  multi-fibres agreement,which dates from  the  end  of 1973,  represents 
a  first attempt  to facilitate continued growth in the exports  of processed 
products from  the developing countries.  They  themselves,nevertheless,  do 
not  seem  to think this is enough. 
6 ~  RUBBER  :  A  WAR  OF  TWO  WORLDS 
The  world market for  rubber is a  battlefield between  the  producers 
of natural rubber and  the  producers  of synthetic.  It is a  war between  two 
worlds  and  the  price is the chief weapon. 
natural rubber  producers  :  natural rubber is almost entirely a  Third World 
product7-!t-is-the-main-ingredient in the  incomes  of big rural populations, 
arid  the  source of important export receipts for countries such as  ~mlaysia 
(28.%  of total exports)  Sri Lanka  and  Indonesia  (18%),Liberia  (la%),Thailand 
(11%).  Production is dominated  by South East Asia,where  ~lalaysia contributed 
1.5 million tonnes  to a  1974  world  total of 3.5 million tonnes.  Indonesian 
production was  935  000  tonnes,  Thailand 380  000  tonnes,  Sri Lanka  135  000 
tonnes and  India 130 000  tonnes.  Apart  from  India  these countries have  a 
predominant  place in world exports,  the  1974  figure  showing  V~laysia 
contributing 1.5 million  tonnes  to a  total world  export of 3.2 million tonnes. 
Indonesia exported 890  000  tonnes,Thailand  365  000  tonnes  and Sri Lanka 
135  000  tonnes.  In these countries rubber-growing is almost entirely an 
export industry.  Local  processing of  the  raw  material scarcely exists and 
the  exports go  mainly to western industrial countries.  In 1973  the EEC 
imported natural rubber  to  a  value  of $660  million,Japan $810 million and 
the United States $380 million. 
~~!~~!~~-~~~~~-£~£~~~~~~ : apart from  some  very small exceptions,  the 
producers of synthetic rubber are all in the industrial countries of  the 
West  and  East  (20.1% of world  production).  The  output  comes  from  mighty 
petrochemical firms,which are  owners  of  the  raw material needed,or from 
equally mighty firms  which  make  rubber tyres and  thus  consume  between  them 
nearly three quarters of  the  rubber produced in the world,whether it be 
natural or synthetic.It is much  easier for such firms  to adjust their 
production to  conform to their requirements.  The  biggest  producers in the - 60-
world are the United States,which made  2.5 million tonnes  of synthetic 
rubber in 1974,out of a  world  total of 7.2 million tonnes.  Next  in order 
comes  the  EEC  (1.  7  million tonnes)  and.-Japan  (860  000  tonnes).  The  trade 
in synthetic  rubber is mainly a  trade between the western industrial 
countries. 
Up  to now  synthetic rubber has  been continually increasing its share 
of  the world market,snatching more  and  more  ground  from  the natural 
product. It is estimated that 7Qro  of the world  consumption  today consists 
of synthetic rubber;  but this trend may  be  seriously checked  by  the oil 
crisis and  the resulting higher cost of  the  raw  material.  The  fact  remains, 
that with this background  the  producers  of natural rubber cannot  reasonably 
hope  to stabilise their market.  In 1971  they set up  their association of 
natural rubber  producing countries;  and  they are doing what  they can to 
bring a  little more  stability into a  market  to which  they look for their 
indispensable receipts.  They  are hoping this will enable  them  to  p~an 
their investments better (at any rate in the big plantations)  and 
ultimately to set up  a  buffer stock. Any  international solution,however, 
if it seeks  to steady the  rubber market,will have  to be  founded  on  co-
operation between  the  producers  of natural and  the  producers  of synthetic 
rubber. 